area handbook series

Greece a country study



Greece a country study

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On the cover: The Parthenon built on the Acropolis in Athens as a temple to the goddess Athena

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Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

> Louis R. Mortimer Chief Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540–5220

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This volume replaces *Greece: A Country Study*, originally published in 1969 and revised in 1977 and 1985. In the years after completion of the 1985 edition, significant political and international events have altered Greece's position, and some changes have also occurred in Greek society and the economy. Among the most important intervening events have been the end of the Cold War, eruption of several national conflicts in the Balkans, and Greece's increased political and economic integration into the structure of the European Union (EU).

The purpose of this study is to present an objective and concise account of the dominant social, economic, political, and national security concerns of contemporary Greece. Sources of information include scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of governmental and international organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers and periodicals, and interviews with individuals who have special knowledge of Greek affairs. Brief comments on some of the more useful, readily accessible sources appear at the end of each chapter. Full references to these and other sources used by the authors are listed in the Bibliography.

The contemporary place-names used in this study are generally those approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names, as set forth in the official gazetteer published in 1960. Many place-names in Greece, however, have standardized international forms (for example, the conventional form Corfu is used rather than the Greek form Kerkira, and Athens is used rather than Athinai). Where appropriate, when the conventional form is used, the vernacular is provided in parentheses. Administrative units, shown in figure 1, are uniformly given in the vernacular. Contemporaneous personal names are universally given in their Greek form (for example, Konstantinos Karamanlis rather than Constantine Karamanlis); historical figures such as Aristotle and Alexander the Great, however, are given in their standardized forms. Table A provides the full Greek and English names for organizations whose acronyms recur in the text. Table B is a chronology of the most significant events of Greek history. The dictionary used was Webster's Tenth Collegiate Dictionary.

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those who are unfamiliar with metric terms (see table 1, Appendix). The Appendix also provides other tabular material on social, economic, government, and military matters.

The body of the text reflects information available as of December 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events and trends that have occurred since the completion of research; the Country Profile and the Chronology include updated information as available; and the Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the reader.

| Acronym | Greek Term | English Translation |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Organizations | | |
| ADEDI | Anotati Dioikousa Epitropi Dimosion Ipallilon | Supreme Civil Servants' Administra- tive Committee |
| DEI | Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou | Public Power Corporation |
| EAM | Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon | National Liberation Front |
| EDES | Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Stra- tos | National Republican Greek League |
| ELAS | Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos | National People's Liberation Army |
| ÉOKA | Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston | National Organization of Cypriot Fighters |
| GSEE | Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ella- dos | General Confederation of Greek Workers |
| IKA | Idryma Kinonikon Asfaliseon | Social Insurance Administration |
| OGA | Organismos Georgikon Asfaliseon | Agricultural Insurance Organization |
| OSE | Organismos Sidirodromon Ellados | Greek Railroads Organization |
| OTE | Organismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados | Greek Telecommunications Organization |
| PEEA | Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftheroseos | Political Committee of National Liberation |
| SEV | Sindesmos Ellinikon Viomikhanion | Association of Greek Industrialists |
| TEVE | Tameio Emporikon Viomihanikon Epihiriseon | Tradesmen's and Craftsmen's Fund fo the Self-Employed |
| Political parties | | |
| EK | Enosis Kentrou | Center Union |
| ERE | Ethniki Rizopastiki Enosis | National Radical Union |
| KKE | Kommunistikon Komma Ellados | Communist Party of Greece |
| ND | Nea Demokratia | New Democracy |
| PA | Politiki Anixi | Political Spring |
| PASOK | Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima | Panhellenic Socialist Movement |
| SYN | Synaspismos | Coalition |
| | | |

Table A: Organizations and Political Parties and Their Acronyms


| Period | Description |
|---------------------|--|
| 2600 B.C. | Early Minoan civilization produces cultural artifacts, beginning 1400 years of Minoan culture on Crete, including introduction of alphabet. |
| 1400s-1300s B.C. | Mycenaean civilization reaches peak on Greek mainland. |
| 1050-800 B.C. | Dark Age of Greece; earlier cultural gains lost in period of stagnation and decline. |
| Ninth Century B.C. | Homer writes Odyssey and Iliad, greatest epic poems of Greek classical liter ature. |
| Eighth Century B.C. | Athens, Sparta, and other city-states emerge and develop trade relations. |
| 750500 B.C. | Era of colonial expansion and cultural diffusion into Italy, eastern Mediterra nean Sea, and Black Sea. |
| 490 B .C. | Greeks defeat Persians at Marathon, ending First Persian War. |
| 481~479 B.C. | After Persian occupation, Greek victories at Salamis (naval) and Plataia (land) end Persian threat permanently and cut cultural ties with Near East. |
| 450s B.C. | Rule of Pericles begins golden age of Athens, including masterpieces of sculpture, architecture, dramaturgy, and philosophy. |
| 421 B.C. | First phase of Peloponnesian War (Athens against Sparta) ends inconclu- sively after ten years of fighting. |
| 404 B.C. | Second phase of Peloponnesian War concludes with Sparta's defeat of Athe- nian navy, ending Athenian golden age. |
| Fourth Century B.C. | City-states decline; Macedonian Empire rises. |
| 336 B.C. | Alexander the Great takes throne of Macedonian Empire after assassination of Philip II. |
| 323 B.C. | Alexander dies after establishing largest empire in history, reaching North Africa and Afghanistan. |
| ca. 300 B.C. | Fragmented Hellenistic kingdoms begin struggle for power. |
| 280 B.C. | Pyrrhus of Epirus begins long series of battles between Greeks and Romans, including Greek participation in Punic Wars on side of Carthage. |
| 86 B.C. | Athens conquered by Rome. |
| 31 B.C. | Mark Antony's defeat at Battle of Actium brings final integration of Greece into Roman Empire. |
| 31 B.CA.D. 180 | Pax Romana, peaceful period of cultural flowering and rise of Greeks into empire's ruling elite. |
| 313 | In Edict of Milan, Emperor Constantine establishes Roman Empire's tolera- tion of Christianity |
| 364 | Roman Empire officially split into Latin Roman (western) and Greek Byzan- tine (eastern) empires. |
| Fifth century | Greek Orthodox Christianity rises as official religion of Byzantine Empire, which dominates former Roman Empire after fall of Rome; schism with Roman Catholic Church deepens until final break in 1054. |
| 567867 | Byzantine Empire declines and shrinks as Slavic and Islamic groups expand from West and East. |
| 367 | Macedonian Dynasty begins expansion, cultural and economic growth, and consolidation of Byzantine control in Balkans. |
| 1071 | Decline of Byzantine Empire accelerates with Seljuk Turk capture of Emperor Romanus IV. |
| 204 | Fourth Crusade sacks Constantinople; Greece divided into small units by Western occupiers. |

| Period | Description | |
|-----------|--|--|
| 12611453 | Palaeologus Dynasty solidifies Byzantine Empire, withstands increasing pressure from Ottoman Turks. | |
| 1453 | Ottoman Turks capture Constantinople, ending Byzantine Empire; most of Greece in Ottoman hands. | |
| 1453–1821 | Greece, except for Ionian Islands, remains part of Ottoman Empire. | |
| 1821–32 | Under intellectual influence of the Enlightenment and with intervention by France and Britain, Greek War of Independence liberates part of modern Greece. | |
| 1828 | Ioannis Kapodistrias becomes first president of fledgling Greek state. | |
| 1832 | Treaty of Constantinople places Greece under British, French, and Russian protection, defines its boundaries, and names Otto of Wittgenstein ruler. | |
| 1844 | First constitution establishes democratic parliamentary government system, reducing Otto's power. | |
| 1854 | Britain and France prevent Greece from taking Ottoman territory in Thrace and Epirus, humiliating Otto. | |
| 1862 | After series of coups, Otto forced to abdicate. | |
| 1864 | New constitution establishes powerful parliament; Prince William of Den- mark named king as George I. | |
| 1866 | First revolt on Crete against Ottoman rule. | |
| 1875 | George accepts principle of parliamentary majority party forming govern- ment, ending fractious minority administrations. | |
| 1875 | Kharilaos Trikoupis becomes prime minister, beginning quarter-century of government domination by him and ideological opposite Theodoros Deli- yannis. | |
| 1881 | After Great Power pressure at 1878 Congress of Berlin, Ottoman Empire cedes Thessaly and part of Epirus to Greece. | |
| 1886 | Britain and France blockade Greece after Deliyannis mobilizes troops to profit from Serbian-Bulgarian conflict. | |
| 1897 | Financial collapse ends with national bankruptcy. | |
| 1908 | Young Turks overthrow government in Constantinople, beginning reform of Turkish politics and society. | |
| 1909 | Military coup at Goudi overthrows Greek government; Eleutherios Venizelo chosen to head new government. | |
| 1912–13 | Balkan Wars add southern Epirus, Macedonia, some Aegean Islands, and Crete to Greek territory. | |
| 1915 | Venizelos resigns over King Constantine's failure to support Allies in World War I, beginning constitutional crisis termed the National Schism. | |
| 1917 | Constantine passes crown to his son Alexander; Greek forces join Allies for remainder of war. | |
| 1920 | Treaty of Sèvres establishes Greek enclave around Smyrna in Asia Minor. | |
| 922 | After disastrous military defeat in Asia Minor, Smyrna is sacked and Greek forces withdraw. | |
| 1923 | Treat of Lausanne cedes all territory in Asia Minor to Turkey; huge influx of Greek refugees in exchange of ethnic minorities between Greece and Tur- key. | |
| 928 | Chaotic period of government coups ends; second Venizelos golden age begins. | |
| 930 | World financial crisis initiates new political and economic unrest in Greece. | |
| 932 | Venizelos resigns; National Schism reemerges. | |
| 1936–41 | Dictatorial regime of General Ioannis Metaxas. | |

| Period | Description |
|----------------|---|
| 1941 | Nazi forces invade Greece; start of four years of destructive occupation; National Liberation Front founded as resistance movement. |
| 1943 | Resistance splits; communist-dominated EAM faction, major element of resistance activity, forms resistence government in Greece. |
| 1944 | Athens liberated; Greece assigned to British sphere by agreement with Soviet Union; communist insurgency leads to fall of Papandreou govern- ment. |
| 1945 | Varkiza Agreement ends insurgency; White Terror persecution of leftist resistance forces. |
| 194649 | Civil War between communist Democratic Army of Greece and government |
| 1947 | Massive United States aid starts with Truman Doctrine. |
| 1949 | Marshall Plan aids reconstruction period of Greek economy and society fol- lowing World War II and Civil War. |
| 1950 | Martial law lifted; first civilian elections held; two decades of economic growth begin. |
| 1955 | Konstantinos Karamanlis named prime minister, beginning eight-year regime; violent terrorist campaign of National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) begins against British occupation of Cyprus and for union with Greece. |
| 1963 | Karamanlis's resignation begins period of instability and increased leftist influence. |
| 1967 | Military junta takes power, begins seven-year regime and period of interna- tional isolation; King Constantine goes into exile. |
| 1973 | University student uprisings and radicalization of junta increase social resis- tance to regime. |
| 1974 | Turkey invades Cyprus in response to coup attempt against Cypriot Presiden Makarios; military regime replaced by new Karamanlis civilian govern- ment; voters abolish monarchy; democratic institutions restored. |
| 1975 | New constitution establishes republican government; Communist Party of Greece legalized; Turkish Federated State of Cyprus declared. |
| 1981 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) ends postwar conservative contro of government, begins eight-year rule with broad reform program under Andreas Papandreou; Greece gains full membership in European Commu- nity (EC). |
| 1986 | Constitutional amendments curtail presidential power. |
| 1987 | Incident in Aegean Sea brings Greece and Turkey to brink of armed conflict |
| 1989 | Two elections yield stalemated coalition governments after scandals under- mine PASOK support. |
| 1990 April | Konstantinos Mitsotakis's New Democracy (ND) party wins half of Assem- bly seats and forms new government. |
| 1991 September | Declaration of sovereignty by Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia arouses nationalist outcry in Greece against possibility of EC recognition of country under name Macedonia; Greek campaign against recognition begins. |
| December | Soviet Union dissolves, beginning revision of Greece's national security position and military doctrine. |
| 1992 August | Privatization of mass transit brings general strike against Mitsotakis govern- ment economic policies. |
| 1993 March | EC adopts five-year economic reform program for Greece. |
| June | Political Spring party formed, based on nationalist hard-line Macedonia pol- icy and drawing support from ND. |

| Perio | od | Description |
|-------|----------|---|
| | October | After austerity program and scandals weaken ND, Papandreou again is elected prime minister. |
| | November | Maastrict Treaty goes into effect, creating new levels of cooperation in the European Community and redisignating that organization as the European Union (EU). |
| 1994 | February | Greece imposes unilateral trade embargo on Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; EU declares embargo violates international law. |
| | April | Assembly revokes citizenship of exiled King Constantine; border incident brings Albanian crackdown on Albanian Greek minority. |
| 1994 | June | End of Greece's six-month presidency of EU; Greece expels thousands of illegal Albanian immigrants. |
| 1994 | Fall | Diplomatic dispute with Turkey aroused by Greek claims to territorial waters in Aegean; armed conflict narrowly avoided. |
| 1995 | March | Assembly elects Konstantinos Stefanopoulos president as compromise candi- date, averting parliamentary stalemate and early elections. |
| 1995 | June | Assembly ratifies United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, bringing new Turkish threats of war if the treaty terms implemented in Aegean Sea. |

Country Profile



Country

Formal Name: Hellenic Republic. Short Form: Greece. Term for Citizens: Greek(s). Capital: Athens.

Geography

Size: 131,957 square kilometers.

Topography: About 80 percent of territory mountainous. Nine geographically and historically defined regions (six mainland, three insular). Most extensive lowlands are plains of Thessaly in northeast. Highly irregular coastline marked by many bays, coves, and inlets. No point on mainland peninsula more than 100 kilometers from sea. Coastline total length 15,000 kilometers. About 20 percent of land area composed of over 2,000 islands, ranging from small rock formations to Crete, fifth largest island in Mediterranean Sea.

Climate: Predominantly hot, dry summers and cold, damp winters, with some variation at higher elevations and inland. Northern mountains have cold continental winters and more precipitation. Coastal regions and islands parched by dry summer winds. Rainfall greatest along west coast, least on east coast and on Aegean islands.

Society

Population: According to 1991 official census, 10,264,156, of which 51 percent female; predicted to remain stable through the year 2010.

Ethnic Groups and Languages: About 98 percent of population ethnic Greeks; largest minority groups Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Macedonian Slavs, Pomaks, Turks, and Vlachs. Influx of Albanian refugees in 1990s a source of tension. Modern Greek spoken on mainland and most islands; existing regional dialects do not impede communication.

Religion: Officially established church Orthodox Church of Greece, to which 97 percent of population belongs. Small numbers of Roman Catholics, Muslims, various Protestant groups, and Jews.

Education: About 93 percent of population over age fifteen literate. Nine years of education free and compulsory; next three optional years, also free, divided into college preparatory and technical programs. Fewer than 10 percent of students in private schools. State-controlled university system highly competitive; postsecondary technical and vocational schools also available.

Health: Health care reorganized in 1980s into state-run National Health Service, to which private facilities added after 1990. Distribution of facilities and medical personnel uneven, concentrated in Athens and Thessaloniki; shortages of nurses and specialized personnel everywhere. Health insurance dominated by state organizations with varying coverage programs.

Economy

Salient Features: Very slow growth in early 1990s, hindered by expanding debt in public sector, except for specific branches. In early 1990s, heavily regulated sectors (transportation, telecommunications, utilities) liberalized to streamline and expand market economy and resource allocation, with largescale support from European Union (EU) funds. Government control of prices and wages ended early 1990s. Flourishing underground economy based in small enterprises and service sector.

Energy: Consumption increased by 42 percent 1982–92, generation by 48 percent 1980–90. Main electricity sources coal-burning (66 percent) and liquid-fuel-burning (23 percent) thermoelectric stations and hydroelectric stations (10 percent). Role of coal expanding. Nearly all electricity from government-owned plants.

Mining: Small percentage of economy but based on significant mineral wealth, especially lignite, bauxite, ferronickel ores, magnesite, sulfur ores, ferrochrome ores, kaolin, asbestos, and marble. Crude oil, rapidly depleted, extracted only in north Aegean Sea.

Manufacturing: In 1991 contributed almost 18 percent of gross domestic product and employed 19 percent of labor force. Principal products textiles, clothing and footwear, processing of food, beverages, and tobacco, chemical products, construction materials, transportation equipment, and metals (iron, steel, and aluminum). Predominance of small enterprises prevents economies of scale and limits research and development. Some industries showed substantial growth in early 1990s.

Agriculture: Labor force and share of national productivity declining through 1980s and early 1990s. About 3.7 million hectares used for crops and pasturage, 59 percent in plains. Landholdings small and labor-to-land ratio high compared with West European standards. Livestock production 30 percent of agricultural total. Major crops tobacco, cotton, sugar beets, grains, vegetables, fruits, olives, and grapes. Main agricultural exports grains, fruits, vegetables, and tobacco products.

Services: Tourism major source of foreign currency, growing annually with strong government subsidy. Banking and finance diversified widely in early 1990s, providing vital credit and investment support for national economy. Shipping services also major foreign-exchange earner.

Foreign Trade: In 1990s increasingly focused on EU, where trade barriers lowest. Main partners Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. Exports 50 percent manufactured products, 30 percent agricultural, and fuels and ores 18 percent. Imports 40 percent manufactured goods, 25 percent raw materials and fuels, 21 percent equipment, and 14 percent foods. Annual oil import from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) averages US\$1.5 billion to US\$2 billion in 1990s. Extensive investment in manufacturing in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Currency: Drachma; exchange rate in May 1995 US\$1 equaled approximately Dr230.

Fiscal Year: Calendar year.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Ports and Shipping: Main ports Heraklion (Crete), Igoumenitsa, Kavala, Patras, Piraeus (serving Athens), Thessaloniki, and Volos; 116 smaller ports also handle passengers or freight. Merchant fleet, 1,407 vessels in 1994, drastic reduction from 1980s size because of expanded overland transport and international shipping slump. No navigable rivers; six-kilometer Corinth Canal connects Ionian Sea with Aegean Sea, cutting 325 kilometers from voyage between seas.

Roads: Automobile travel expanded rapidly in 1980s and early 1990s. Road congestion a serious problem in Athens and Thessaloniki. In 1990 some 38,312 kilometers of roads in service, of which 21,000 kilometers paved and 116 kilometers express roads. Road network to be expanded significantly in late 1990s with EU aid.

Railroads: Standard-gauge routes totaled 1,565 kilometers in 1994, of total 2,503 kilometers in network run by state Greek

Railroads Organization. Railroad construction generally ignored in favor of road and air transportation until 1980s, when modernization and extension programs began, especially on Athens-Thessaloniki line. In 1992 some 214 diesel locomotives in service. Athens-Piraeus electrified urban line of twenty-six kilometers upgraded in early 1990s.

Civil Aviation: State-owned Olympia Airways monopolizes air travel, operating American-made jets to most points in Europe and the Middle East and selected destinations in the Far East, Africa, and the United States. Nine international and twentyeight domestic airports in operation; new airport planned at Spata to serve Athens region.

Pipelines: None in operation in 1995; in late 1990s, EU will finance 520 kilometer natural gas pipeline from Bulgaria to supply Thessaloniki and Athens and upgrade industrial development in northeastern Greece.

Telecommunications: Development of modern communications lines has been slow. In 1992, 5.3 million telephones in service. Government monopoly of broadcasting ended 1987, bringing significant diversity in radio and television programming.

Government and Politics

Government: Form prescribed in 1975 constitution and 1986 amendments on executive power. Divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Main executive body is Cabinet, chosen by prime minister; cabinet reflects policy of Assembly, which can dismiss it with no-confidence vote. President has limited, mostly ceremonial powers. Legislature is unicameral Assembly of 300 members serving four-year terms; Cabinet has strong role in introducing legislation. Judiciary is independent, divided into criminal, civil, and administrative courts; judges appointed by presidential decree on advice of Judicial Council.

Politics: Dominated by two parties, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima—PASOK) and New Democracy (Nea Demokratia—ND), since 1981, with some smaller parties exerting influence. Strong role of personal connections and personalities rather than institutions in everyday relations, with movement toward emphasis on mass appeal and issues in mid-1990s. PASOK government under Andreas Papandreou elected 1993.

Administrative Divisions: Fifty-one provinces are basic element of subnational government. Local governments are 359 municipalities (over 10,000 population) and 5,600 communes (5,000 to 10,000 population). Monastic center of Mt. Athos has status as autonomous region outside regular structure.

Foreign Relations: Defined by membership in EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), providing strong link to Western Europe. End of Cold War reduced strategic role in NATO, leaving traditional enmity of Turkey and unresolved occupation of Cyprus as key issues. Heavy postwar reliance on United States lessened in early 1990s, more diversified position sought. Conflict in former Yugoslavia and in Albania major regional concerns, affecting trade and immigration policy; Macedonian independence provokes strong nationalist feeling.

National Security

Armed Forces: Hellenic Armed Forces divided into army, air force, and navy, with reserve components. Ground forces (Hellenic Army) include 113,000 active personnel, of whom 100,000 conscripts, with 350,000 reserves; Hellenic Air Force 26,800 personnel, of whom 14,400 conscripts; Hellenic Navy 19,500 personnel, of whom 7,900 conscripts. Terms of activeduty service range from eighteen to twenty-three months.

Major Military Units: Army in one field army divided into four corps plus Higher Military Command of the Interior and the Islands, headquartered in Athens. First and second corps defend northern border, third and fourth corps defend Turkish border and islands. Organization includes nine infantry divisions plus specialized units. Three air force commands, one based in Larisa, two in Athens. Tactical Air Command is main combat command. Eight major air force installations. Three navy commands: fleet (operational), Naval Training Command, and Naval Logistics Command.

Military Budget: Highest percentage of defense expenditure among NATO countries, about 5.5 percent of gross national product in early 1990s. Equipment purchase and modernization targeted to specialized needs dictated by doctrine and defense posture.

Internal Security Forces: Police, reorganized in 1984 into

single national paramilitary unit of 26,500 called Hellenic Police (Elliniki Astinomia—EL.AS). Special security forces include special tasks and missions units for riot control, Special Forces Squad for special threats, and Counterterrorism Squad, expanded in mid-1990s. Ministry of Public Order directs security forces. Customs Police, Hellenic Police, and Okana (state drug agency) are major narcotics agencies.




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Greece, 1994




Figure 2. Geographic Setting, 1994

FOR GREECE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY has been a period full of violence and uncertainty. The last years of the century, however, have brought the potential for political stability in a slowly maturing democratic system, and for economic prosperity as a part of a European continent undergoing unprecedented unification. Democracy, the theoretical basis of governance since the foundation of the modern Greek state in 1832, has had its longest and most consistent application in the era that began with the toppling of the military junta in 1974. Economic growth, which virtually stopped in the 1980s, showed signs of revival in the early 1990s, aided by substantial infrastructural aid programs and strict economic guidelines from Greece's partner nations in the European Union (EU-see Glossary). On the negative side, Greece's traditionally difficult relations with neighbor Turkey remained extremely tense as a series of territorial issues were still unresolved in the mid-1990s. And the violently unstable regions of the former Yugoslavia, just to Greece's north, renewed the threat that the wider Balkan turmoil of earlier decades might begin a new chapter.

Rooted in the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations of the third millennium B.C., the cultural heritage of Greece has evolved without interruption despite four centuries of Ottoman rule (fifteenth through nineteenth centuries) over the entire Greek peninsula. In the eighth century B.C., Greeks began establishing colonies throughout the Mediterranean and Black sea regions, spreading a cultural influence that remains in modern times. Following the development of the Greek polis as the dominant political entity on the Greek peninsula, for several decades in the fifth century B.C. Athens was the center of unparalleled political and cultural accomplishment. Among the contributions to modern civilization that emerged from Greece in that period are the art forms of a group of great sculptors and dramatists, the philosophical approaches of three great thinkers, and the governmental innovations of the great Athenian leader Pericles. After the fall of the Athenian Empire around 400 B.C., Alexander the Great extended his short-lived empire deep into Central Asia. Between his death in 323 B.C. and the Ottoman occupation in

the 1450s, Greece was a culturally influential part, first of the Roman Empire, then of the Byzantine Empire.

The Greek War of Independence (1821-32) resulted from a convergence of internal and international circumstances that simultaneously revived the Greek national consciousness and weakened the hold of the Ottoman Empire. The modern Greek state emerged from its struggle for liberation under close control of the European Great Powers and with quite vivid irredentist longings. In the nineteenth century, the West placed men from noble families of two countries, first Bavaria and then Denmark, on the new throne of Greece. For more than a century after independence, nationalist expansionism and extreme political factionalism hindered smooth development and brought frequent intervention by Britain and France. Progressive regimes such as those of Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, in the first decades of the twentieth century, were interspersed with heavy international debt, military juntas, struggles between the monarch and elected government officials, and chaotic changes of government. Although the size of the Greek state increased in several stages in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Greek irredentism suffered a serious blow in 1922 when Turkish forces drove the Greeks out of the Smyrna enclave that had been established along the west coast of Asia Minor, causing a huge refugee movement that changed Greece's demography.

Greece was directly involved in the two world wars, suffering devastating damage from the Nazi occupation of 1941–44. The political schism that had begun in the early 1900s between royalists and republicans then fueled a disastrous civil war immediately following World War II.

Greece emerged from the calamitous 1940s shattered economically, socially, and politically. Recovery was remarkably fast in the economic sphere and to some degree in society, but for another thirty years the left side of the political spectrum was suppressed in the wake of Civil War anticommunism, enabling conservative factions to dominate. The final stage of that domination, the totalitarian military regime of 1967–74, gave way to a broad spectrum of political activity and parliamentary representation that has prospered since 1974.

In the postwar period, Greece's foreign relations have been determined by the need for economic and military security, provided first by Britain, then by the United States and the European Community (EC—see Glossary). In that period, two

aspects of international geopolitics dominated Greece's foreign policy: the Cold War between the Soviet Union and its allies and the West and the latest stages of Greece's long-term struggle with Turkey over control of the two countries' overlapping territorial claims in the Aegean Sea. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its alliances in 1991, but the tensions with Turkey, represented most concretely in the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the status of the island of Cyprus, continued unabated into the mid-1990s. Turkey took control of part of the island in 1974 in response to a Greek nationalist coup attempt. The autonomous state declared at that time in northeast Cyprus on behalf of the Turkish minority remained a major irritant to relations into the mid-1990s. In several instances in the 1980s and the 1990s, the two nations narrowly averted war over the status of territory or resources in the Aegean Sea. The presence of vocal nationalist factions in Greece and Turkey pushed the respective governments away from positions of conciliation on the issues of the Aegean and Cyprus, despite substantial sentiment for harmonious relations between the two members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-see Glossary).

After Greece achieved full EC membership in 1981, economic and political ties with more prosperous European nations grew steadily and greatly benefited Greece. However, in 1991 the emergence of new independent states from the collapsed Republic of Yugoslavia on Greece's northern border caused strains in this relationship. In opposition to EC policies, Greece defended the aggressive actions of traditional ally and trading partner Serbia toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the same period Greece waged a vigorous campaign against recognition of Slavic Macedonia, another fragment of former Yugoslavia that declared independence in 1991.

Greek society is characterized by substantial ethnic and cultural homogeneity. An estimated 98 percent of citizens are of Greek descent, with small minorities of Albanians, Armenians, southern Slavs, Turks, and Vlachs. In the 1990s, the foremost minority problem has been the influx of illegal Albanian immigrants from across the northwestern border.

Migration within the borders of Greece has assumed definite patterns. Although the net shift of Greek citizens from rural to urban areas began with the first wave of industrialization before 1900, the economic growth of the post-World War II period was accompanied by a more intense urbanization that moved more than 2 million residents out of rural areas in the postwar decades.

Greece's religious homogeneity matches its ethnic makeup and reflects tradition born in the later years (fourth century A.D.) of the Eastern Roman Empire. The Orthodox Church of Greece, the established state religion, is the professed faith of 97 percent of Greek citizens. In recent decades, the church, which maintains substantial influence outside the strictly theological realm, has defended its doctrine in disputes with secular groups over social issues such as the legalization of abortion and civil marriages. Freedom of religion is a constitutional guarantee, although proselytization by some groups has been restricted.

Both the education and the health care of Greek citizens are overwhelmingly dominated by state agencies. Greek society affords great respect to education because of Greece's venerable classical heritage and because Greeks traditionally have seen education as the key to social advancement. The centralized education system, the lower levels of which underwent major reform in the 1970s, oversees most of Greece's postsecondary institutions. The shortage of university positions has put great pressure on secondary students and created a "brain drain" by forcing many to attend universities abroad.

Health care in Greece also has undergone substantial reform in the last two decades, although uneven distribution of health resources such as doctors, nurses, and clinics is still considered a major problem. The National Health Service, established in 1983 to centralize health care, has exerted varied degrees of control according to the political complexion of the government in power. This variation changes the ratio of public and private health care; since 1990, however, private medical practices and private hospitals have increased.

The economic progress of modern Greece has been very uneven, with few periods of sustained growth. Despite periodic modernization programs that began in the late nineteenth century, until the middle of the following century Greece remained predominantly an agricultural nation. Then, following the destruction of much of its infrastructure in World War II and the Civil War of 1946–49, the Greek economy grew, with substantial Western aid, at a phenomenal rate in the 1950s and the 1960s. An important aspect of this growth was the development of the industrial sector into a significant part of the national economy, which was bolstered by a number of large investment projects backed by West European nations. The most important elements of this growth were the shipping, chemical, pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, and electrical machinery industries. By the early 1970s, however, a major economic crisis developed. Caused by the inept economic policies of the military regime, an international fuel crisis, and excessive borrowing in the public sector, the crisis brought production growth to a standstill in many parts of the economy for the next fifteen years. Budget deficits and inflation climbed in the 1980s, bringing a series of stabilization policies that included tax reform and privatization of state enterprises.

Among the continuing structural problems of the Greek economy are the substantial size of the underground economy, the predominance of small enterprises, the need for more efficient taxation procedures, the failure of privatization programs, and excessive spending by the public sector. However, in the early 1990s closer integration of national economies in Europe and stringent EU requirements for continued participation in union aid programs spurred reforms and streamlining by Greek economic policy makers. By 1994 inflation had dropped significantly, and growth occurred in several longstagnant manufacturing industries, spurring the hope that private investment might stimulate another period of growth.

In the postwar period, Greece's traditional trade partners were consistently European (the top three were Germany, Italy, and France), with the United States the most important partner outside the EC. In the early 1990s, major gains were made in trade with nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the most important aspect of Greece's foreign trade policy was increased integration into the EU system, a process that had entailed liberalization of trade policy in the late 1980s and meeting stringent standards for deficits, production growth, inflation, and unemployment by 1998 under the EU Convergence Plan.

Beginning with the military regime of General Ioannis Metaxas (1936–41), the left wing of Greek politics was forcibly excluded from participation in government—a policy bred in the National Schism between royalists and republicans and reinforced after World War II by the bitterness of the Civil War fighting between communist guerrillas and the national government. Although the exclusion ended technically with legalization of the Communist Party of Greece in 1974, the Greek left took control of the government for the first time in 1981 with the triumph of Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima-PASOK). In the fourteen years that followed, PASOK and the main conservative party, New Democracy (Nea Demokratia-ND), gained alternating majorities in the unicameral legislative Assembly. Although the two parties started the 1980s with drastically opposed positions on issues of national security and domestic economics, by the early 1990s both positions had moved toward the center in many respects. This centrist drift was especially true of PASOK, which during the 1980s dropped much of its socialist program as well as its opposition to Greek participation in NATO. In this period, political campaigns were waged more on accusations of corruption and malfeasance than on divergent policy approaches. Under these conditions, experts pointed to the disenchantment of the Greek electorate as a major cause of the two changes in majority control between 1989 and 1993 and the inability of either party to form a government after the 1989 elections.

Meanwhile, even lacking significant policy differences, the two major parties maintained a hold on power that made emergence of significant new political groups increasingly difficult. The strongest new party to emerge in the early 1990s, Political Spring, was dedicated to the single issue of preventing world recognition of independent Macedonia. At the same time, the next-largest party, the Communist Party of Greece, lost significant support. Both PASOK and the ND expected a new generation of leaders to emerge in the mid-1990s once long-time stalwarts Papandreou and Konstantinos Karamanlis retired.

Even in the more liberal political climate that has prevailed since 1974, the free exchange of political ideas has been hampered by a long tradition of individual patron-client relationships that take the place of the Western-style interaction of coherent interest groups. For example, labor unions are not permanently active in pursuing their members' goals, and environmental groups have exercised rather inconclusive influence over government policy toward consumption of natural resources and pollution.

The focus of Greek foreign policy changed somewhat in the early 1990s with the curtailment of Greece's strategic responsibilities in NATO, although the resentment of the 1980s toward perceived Western domination had dissipated in most political circles. Despite Greece's enthusiastic support of EU unification goals, however, its policy toward the fragmented states of the former Yugoslavia caused friction with other member states. The main sources of friction were Greece's lobbying to prevent recognition of an independent state of Macedonia and Greece's refusal to honor the UN embargo on its erstwhile ally and major trading partner Serbia, in response to Serbian actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both positions had substantial support in the Greek electorate and influential parts of the Greek media. As a result, in 1993 and 1994 Greece struggled to avoid isolation within the European body.

Another major source of regional friction, the refugee movement from Albania into northern Greece, raised tensions with that neighbor and temporarily halted the large-scale aid initiative that Greece had begun after the fall of Albania's last communist regime. By the end of 1994, however, Greece had made gestures of reconciliation that improved relations, and the border situation was under negotiation.

In 1947 the United States initiated a large aid program to prevent communist guerrillas from defeating Greek government forces in the Civil War. With that program, the United States replaced Britain as Greece's most important source of material aid and national security protection-a relationship that was to last until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Greece joined NATO in 1952 as an extension of the anticommunism policy established as a result of the Civil War. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Greece's most immediate national security problems have been associated with a variety of conflicts with Turkey. The major components of that clash have been the Turkish occupation of part of the island of Cyprus; conflicts over sea and air jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea; and the existence of a substantial Muslim population in Greece's easternmost province, which borders on Turkey. Since Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, a number of international forums and individual arbiters have failed to resolve the fundamental conflict of national security positions between the two neighbors.

Greece's designated Cold War role in NATO was the support and basing of United States and West European forces in the eastern Mediterranean, considered a crucial location in the event of a land attack in Europe by Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) forces. After 1991, Greek national security policy concentrated more heavily on defense against a possible Turkish attack in the Aegean Sea or in Cyprus. In that period, Greek military policy has been to seek diversification of its foreign support and supplies; accordingly, the United States presence has waned although bilateral defense agreements remain in place. In the early 1990s, military doctrine turned fully toward smaller units with enhanced mobility and firepower and modernization of specific types of equipment seen as most supportive of that approach.

A number of economic indicators provided a generally positive outlook for Greece in 1995. The strong likelihood that the PASOK government would not have to face an election for the next two years improved the prospects of reducing the budget deficit and the inflation that for many years had combined to impede economic growth. In mid-1995, experts predicted that the annual inflation rate would be slightly below 10 percent at the end of 1995 and 8.5 percent in 1996. Given increased public investment (including the start of construction on the Spata international airport), Greece's gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) could rise by 2 percent in 1996. (Between 1992 and 1994, average annual GDP growth was 0.4 percent.)

The public-sector deficit was generally identified as Greece's most pressing economic problem at the beginning of 1995. The 1994 national budget projected a deficit of Dr2.4 trillion (for value of the drachma-see Glossary), a figure that was exceeded in that year by about Dr360 billion. Despite the overshot on Greece's borrowing requirement, the final figure was well within EU requirements for that stage. The 1995 budget, which includes government borrowing equal to 10.7 percent of GDP, also met the targets of the EU's Greek Convergence Program. Experts did not expect Greece to exceed its 1995 public borrowing estimate, but they believed that budgeted expenditures for 1995, based on anticipated revenue increases of 26.9 percent from newly stringent tax enforcement policies, were unrealistically high. The budget also relies on a very low 1995 interest payment rate on the public debt, 3.6 percent. Overall, government debt was expected to rise from its 1994 level of 116.9 percent of GDP to 117.4 percent of GDP in 1995.

The government's inability to collect taxes from the many self-employed Greek citizens has been a major cause of Greece's high public debt. In 1994 more than 70 percent of personal income tax came from salaried individuals whose incomes were easily documented. A series of measures devised by the Ministry of Finance to curtail rampant tax evasion by companies and individuals encountered obstacles early in 1995. After a court ruled the ministry's suspension of trade privileges an unconstitutional punishment for corporate tax evasion, the process of naming violators slowed noticeably, although the ministry's close monitoring of transaction documents continued in the first half of 1995.

Plans were announced for a special tax police force with the power to arrest offenders, expediting the lengthy court procedures that had hindered enforcement in the past. At the same time, new excise taxes went into effect on tobacco products and gambling establishments. To improve collection of taxes on self-employed citizens, a new law bases assessments on presumed rather than reported earnings. In early 1995, farmers, merchants, and other self-employed Greeks demonstrated and struck against the new system, and the powerful General Confederation of Greek Merchants claimed that it would cripple Greece's retail market. Despite resistance, revenue collection rose substantially in the first half of 1995.

Privatization remained a key economic issue in the first half of 1995. After 1993 PASOK policies, which had alienated the business community in the 1980s by favoring nationalization, shifted to a more pragmatic stance toward privatization and gained support from the Association of Greek Industrialists and other business groups. Experts cited opposition from labor organizations and the ND's failure to support PASOK privatization programs as the causes of Greece's generally slow progress in this area; little privatization of any kind was achieved in the first half of 1995.

The privatization of state enterprises, a program that received a serious blow in November 1994 with the suspension of sales of shares in the state-owned Greek Telecommunications Organization (Organismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados-OTE), was scheduled to continue in 1995. Plans called for shares in OTE and the Public Petroleum Corporation to become available on the Athens Stock Exchange sometime in 1995. However, poor performance and high levels of indebtedness by OTE were expected to decrease the value of its shares. The emergence of private competition was expected to challenge OTE and another government monopoly, the Public Power Corporation (Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou-DEI). Plans called for two privately owned wind-energy plants to be built on Crete in 1995, providing the first major test of private power production in Greece by more than doubling Greece's installed capacity of wind energy.

Several EU assistance programs targeting Greece offered an average of US\$10 billion per year from 1995 through 1999. Disagreements between Greek authorities and the European Commission (see Glossary) about supervisory control of EU public works projects prevented utilization of much of the money allocated for the first half of 1995, however. Most of the large projects for which such assistance had been designed (most notably in the so-called Second Delors Package) never got underway; the main exception was the new Spata international airport near Athens, which was scheduled to begin construction in the fall of 1995 after an agreement was signed with the German Hochtief corporation in July. That deal creates a private-public joint venture that will manage the airport for its first thirty years.

In June 1995, the Ministry of National Economy reported increased private investment in Greek industry. With the aid of substantial government subsidies, investment rates for 1995 were considerably above those for 1994. Concentrated on machinery and commercial building, the investment trend was expected to continue into 1996. Experts warned, however that investment must focus more strongly on infrastructure and retraining of the labor force to achieve long-term growth.

In mid-1995 the Ministry of Labor reported declining investment and rising unemployment in some sectors of the economy, mostly traditional industries that were unable to apply new technology, and find new markets as other industries were restructuring. The most notable losses occurred in the garment and textile industries. The latter industry, which accounts for 40 percent of Greece's industrial exports and 25 percent of its overall industrial product, has declined because of outmoded equipment and competition from imported materials. Meanwhile, expansion continued into the mid-1990s in the food and beverage industries, mining, services, trade, transportation, and banking.

The tourism industry, whose growth in the early 1990s had been an important part of the national economy, suffered setbacks in the summer of 1995. In July an announcement by the United States Department of State of an indefinite terrorist threat against American tourists in Greece, together with similar warnings in the German media, seriously reduced the normally substantial summer tourist income from those countries. Such publicity exacerbated Greece's reputation as a haven for terrorists, which had worsened with a series of assassinations and bombings in 1994. Long-standing friction with United States antiterrorist intelligence agencies resulted in dismissal of the chief of the national police's Antiterrorist Service in early 1995.

As 1995 began, a number of political issues and questions were on the agenda for Greek policy makers. A key question, the prospect of parliamentary elections being forced by a stalemate over the choice of a new president, was avoided when Andreas Papandreou withdrew from presidential consideration in November 1994 and compromise candidate Konstantinos Stefanopoulos was elected and inaugurated in March 1995. That outcome, which avoided a fifth national election in a period of six years, was a great relief to all parties and to the Greek public as well.

The compromise ensured that the present government would remain in power until the next scheduled parliamentary elections in October 1997. Such stability would greatly improve Greece's chances of meeting the long-term requirements of the EU's Convergence Program, which provides the guidelines for full participation and benefits in that organization. Experts believed that PASOK would now feel free to take some of the unpopular steps (such as reductions in public-sector spending) needed to gain control of the economy.

At the beginning of 1995, both parties proposed a number of constitutional amendments. Among the fifty-two changes to be discussed were proposals to prescribe specifically the separation of church and state; strengthen privacy rights by prohibiting storage of data on an individual; and formally abolish the death penalty (which has not been applied since 1972). Also on the table were proposals to reinforce the constitutional status of the Assembly and the political parties; specifically state Greece's commitment to the EU and to European unity in general; strengthen the independence of the judiciary and establish a Supreme Judicial Council; and reform conditions of employment in the public sector. ND leaders added a proposal upgrading the president's power to convene meetings and to issue proclamations (the last constitutional amendments in 1986 had weakened presidential powers substantially) and a proposal for reform of election campaign financing. PASOK declared all amendments except for the presidential powers provision open for negotiation.

By the end of 1994, both major political parties were seriously divided into two or more factions, threatening the ability of each to make headway with the electorate between 1995 and the next elections. Experts viewed the conflicts as a healthy sign of democratic change as a new generation debated the proper direction for the future. The public also was uncertain about its political direction: in a national poll in mid-1995, the ND and PASOK, still the two leading parties, each received only 25 percent support, with 30 percent of respondents declaring themselves undecided.

In 1995 the parties faced the imminent retirement of three long-time leaders belonging to the pre-World War II generation—Papandreou, who had led PASOK for the entire twentyone years of its existence, President Konstantinos Karamanlis, an ND leader active in Greek governance since 1951, and former prime minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, also of the ND.

The compromise selection of Konstantinos Stefanopoulosformer leader of the now-defunct Democratic Renewal Party and at age sixty-nine also a veteran politician—as president in March 1995 was a pragmatic move by both sides and a great relief to observers who feared a bloody and indecisive battle over the successor to Karamanlis. In the event, Stefanopoulos received 181 votes, eleven more than the required number, on the third and decisive ballot in the Assembly, and PASOK party discipline enforced the party's official support for a one-time political rival. Also vital to this result was the support of the nationalist Political Spring party, which held eleven seats in the Assembly.

Throughout the first half of 1995, Papandreou vowed to remain as prime minister-although he was physically able to work only briefly each day, and his young wife received substantial criticism from within PASOK and in the media for her increasingly visible role in everyday policy making. Papandreou's professed aim was to bind together PASOK's two increasingly opposed factions, which were labeled the loyalists and the reformists. The reformist faction of PASOK, favoring closer ties with the EU and openly calling for Papandreou to step down, was led by a group of ambitious younger politicians including Minister of Industry, Energy, and Technology Konstantinos Simitis, former EU Commissioner Vasso Papandreou (no relation to the prime minister), and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos. As Papandreou continued to hold power in mid-1995 without naming a successor, several candidates jockeyed for position, and Pangalos emerged as the most outspoken critic of Papandreou. Among Papandreou loyalists, the most likely candidates to succeed the prime minister were Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias and Assembly Speaker Apostolos Kaklamanis.

The ND, meanwhile, faced a rebellion against party leader Miltiades Evert, who was portrayed by a dissident faction as out of touch with the party's political base and accountable for the ND's perceived loss of influence. The leaders of this movement were the former minister of industry, energy, and technology, Andreas Andrianopoulos, and a group of little-known younger politicians. Evert was able to consolidate his position in the first half of 1995 because of his party's generally favorable results in the local and regional elections of late 1994 and because of his victories in various skirmishes with the internal opposition. Former Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who had criticized some Evert policies and to whom many dissidents had looked as a possible replacement for Evert, remained uncommitted in the first half of 1995. Experts believed that wiretapping and bribery charges, which had stood against Mitsotakis until Papandreou dropped them in January 1995, would prevent Mitsotakis from mounting a challenge to Evert.

At the beginning of 1995, Greece's four main foreign policy problems were its tense relations with neighboring Albania and Turkey, continuing conflict in the states of the former Yugoslavia, and Greece's unresolved objections concerning the name and certain policies of the Macedonian state to the north (recognized internationally since 1993 under the cumbersome name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM). Thus Greece continued to find itself in a dangerous national security position between a powerful and influential historical enemy, Turkey, and a chronically unstable region, the Slavic Balkans, at a time when the United States military presence in Greece had been greatly reduced.

Relations with Albania improved early in 1995 with the release of four Greeks jailed in Albania under sedition charges in 1994. In March a meeting between Papandreou and Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha yielded a mutual commitment to sign a treaty of friendship before the end of 1995. Such a treaty would provide human rights guarantees for the Greek minority in Albania, improve the status of illegal Albanian refugees in Greece, resolve border issues, and address issues of banking and economic cooperation. Relations improved further when Greece arrested members of the Greek extremist Northern Epirus Liberation Front, who planned an attack on an Albanian border post.

On the issue of Macedonia-or Skopje in the official Greek terminology that uses the capital city as the country name-Greek officials continued to complain that the government of President Kiro Gligorov remains adamantly opposed to constructive dialogue. However, the elimination of spring elections from the political scene improved the prospects that Greece could make concessions on the Macedonia issue. In the first half of 1995, negotiations by the United Nations (UN) and other intermediaries failed. The use of the term Macedonia in the name of the new nation that emerged from Yugoslavia to Greece's north is objectionable to Greece because that name (and the sunburst design that FYROM included in its national flag) is associated with the Greek empire of Alexander the Great and the present-day northern province of Greece. In conjunction with reckless nationalist rhetoric in FYROM, the name usage has conjured fears of irredentist expansionism into Greek territory. Although compromise was reached on secondary issues, the name question did not yield to any compromise suggested in the first half of 1995. In September talks were set to resume at the foreign ministry level, under United States and UN sponsorship, in New York. This new stage provided hope that the long impasse would finally end, stabilizing one portion of the Balkan region.

Meanwhile, Greece's unilateral embargo of non-humanitarian goods crossing into FYROM, imposed in 1994 in response to that nation's use of the name Macedonia, yielded negative results for Greece as well as for FYROM. The European Commission brought suit against Greece in the European Court of Justice for unjustified restraint of European trade, world opinion was decidedly against the Greek move, and Greek businesses complained of lost revenue and markets. As the court prepared a verdict in mid-1995, Greek diplomats had ample incentive to find a compromise that would avoid two potential sources of embarrassment: an international verdict against a key foreign policy of the Papandreou government and the admission that Greek diplomacy could not resolve a major foreign policy question independently without Western assistance.

Although preliminary indications were that the court would declare the issue outside its jurisdiction, in May Greek and FYROM diplomats proposed an interim "small package" of mutual concessions, including changes in FYROM's flag and in the description of the country in the FYROM constitution and a lifting of the Greek embargo. Amid criticism that such a package would be an admission of failure for Greece, this strategy was abandoned. The Greek blockade of FYROM thus continued through the first half of 1995, as France, Germany, and other EU member countries intensified their objections and UN-sponsored negotiations made no progress. The blockade's severe impact on FYROM's national economy exacerbated ethnic tensions in that country, where hostility between the growing Albanian minority and the Slavic majority threatened to further destabilize Greece's northern border.

A second embargo issue, the international blockade on trade with Serbia imposed by the UN in 1992, also hurt the Greek economy by eliminating an important trading partner except for illegal shipments. Besides commercial ties, Greeks also carried into the 1990s their historical loyalty to Serbia on cultural and religious grounds. In a 1995 poll, over 60 percent of Greeks named Serbia the foreign country for which they had the highest regard. After years of vocal opposition to the UN policy and violation of the embargo at various levels, in May 1995 Greece joined five other regional trading partners of Serbia to lodge an official protest and demand compensation from the UN.

The diplomatic stalemate and Serbian advances in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in 1995 continued to threaten the Balkans with a wider war, offered Greece an opportunity to repair its international diplomatic image and hasten the end of the UN embargo by acting as a neutral negotiator-provided that the Western powers found some diplomatic value in Greece's close ties with Serbs in Belgrade and in Bosnia. In June 1995, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very active in negotiating the release of UN hostages taken by Bosnian Serb forces in Bosnia. At the same time, the official Greek position was that the UN peacekeeping force should remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that any NATO rapid-reaction force, under consideration as a potentially anti-Serbian military unit of the Western powers, must remain under the peacekeeping mandate of the UN. At the same time, the Greek government reiterated that its NATO forces would aid in a withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia but would not participate in a NATO attack on Serbian positions in Bosnia.

Experts expected that the summer of 1995 would be significant in Greek-Turkish relations because of recent expansion of Turkey's navy, the conflict within NATO over location of the organization's Aegean headquarters at the Greek city of Larisa, the prospect of Cyprus's achieving membership in the EU, and increased tension over control of the continental shelf in the Aegean.

Greek-Turkish reciprocal funding vetoes in NATO continued to hinder the financial and strategic planning of that organization, as they had in the early 1990s. Fearing loss of leverage over negotiations on Aegean Sea issues, Turkey vetoed funding for the Larisa base of NATO ground forces, part of a NATO package proposal that also included Multinational Division Headquarters and Air Subheadquarters in Greece. Greece responded with a veto of funding for the Izmir NATO base in western Turkey. In June the United States intensified its pressure on Turkey and revised the proposal on Land Forces headquarters, the most urgent of the issues, to better accommodate the Turkish position.

In June the issue of Aegean control heated up when Greece ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which establishes a twelve-mile continental shelf—giving Greece the legal right to extend its current six-mile limit and in effect nullifying Turkish claims to territorial waters in the Aegean Sea between the Turkish mainland and the Greek islands adjacent to the coast. Having lost this stage of its longstanding battle for control of the Aegean, Turkey, besides Israel and Venezuela the only country not to sign the treaty, threatened war if Greece applied the treaty in this way. An exchange of harsh language and accusations continued through the summer. The Turkish government repeated its claim that Greece was harboring, training, and exporting some of the Kurdish terrorists whose bombs and violent attacks have destabilized Turkey—a claim that Greece denied categorically.

In March 1995, the EU made a commitment to begin discussion of proposed membership for Cyprus and Malta (strongly urged by Greece) to begin within six months of the end of the EU's Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. The commitment also provided Cyprus the same political links with the EU as other prospective members such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Although Greeks hailed the commitment as a step toward the withering of the Turkish enclave in Cyprus, and only Turkey recognized the enclave as a separate nation, the EU's handling of that de facto division was left to membership discussions. After the EU made its Cyprus commitment, Greece withdrew its veto of a proposed customs union between the EU and Turkey, which Turkey had eagerly sought to improve commercial ties in Europe and which was scheduled to go into effect in 1996. Greece's approval carried with it the requirement that a review be made after one year of implementation to determine the union's effect on the Greek textile industry. In any event, Turkey's prospective new position was jeopardized in 1995 by the European Parliament's disapproval of human rights practices in Turkey.

In the first half of 1995, nationalist rhetoric in Greece continued to describe Turkish plots to stir irredentism in the Turkish minority in western Thrace as a base for a Turkish invasion and capture of that Greek province. That strategy was seen as one of three elements of Turkey's offensive position toward Greece, the other two being Cyprus and the Aegean Islands. In May the Turkish navy's acquisition of nine new naval vesselswhose identity was a matter of dispute-brought accusations that Turkey planned to attack the Greek Aegean Islands and Cyprus and become a naval superpower in the Mediterranean. Although overall Turkish military superiority is assumed in all Greek national security doctrine-since 1970 the Turkish army has been the largest NATO force in Europe, and since the mid-1970s its military expenditures have been the highest percentage of gross national product (GNP-see Glossary) aside from Greece's-nationalist factions in Greece used this assertion to urge additional weapons development programs for the Hellenic Navy, which now is building a full-sized navy yard in Cyprus.

In mid-1995, the Greek government, assured that it would remain in power until 1997, announced a set of guidelines as initial bargaining positions on major European issues at the EU Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. Together with overall strong support of social, financial, and political cohesion in Europe, the statement supported EU membership for Cyprus and Malta; dismissed the concept of categorizing EU member nations according to varying speeds of development (a proposed standard of measurement by which Greece would be in the third and most disadvantaged group of nations); and insisted that the EU must achieve unanimous positions on foreign policy issues that are vital to the national interests of member nations.

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In 1995 the government moved toward reform in its national defense establishment. In 1990 and 1993, the incoming Mitsotakis and Papandreou administrations had recalled retired generals with connections to the party in power to assume high staff positions, causing resentment and resignations among senior officers who lost promotion opportunities. New legislation would appoint chiefs of the general staff and service chiefs to fixed terms, and it would strengthen the Assembly's oversight of the Ministry of Defense. Through its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Assembly would have to be consulted in long-term defense and spending policy as well as changes in the command structure.

Domestic security organizations also were involved in controversies in the first half of 1995. In March the minister of justice, Georgios Kouvelakis, resigned in a dispute over alleged corruption in the administration of the national prison system. Kouvelakis, whose investigations had led to charges against an influential senior official, claimed in his resignation statement that his activities had been obstructed by the undersecretary to the prime minister. Also in March, the police beating of pensioners demonstrating for improved benefits brought the resignation of high police officials in Attica Province. Later that month, the minister of public order, Stelios Papathemelis, resigned rather than ordering police to break up a blockade by farmers striking against the new tax policy.

Thus the road to much-needed economic and political reform, as well as the road to improved national security, proved rather uneven in 1995. Nevertheless, major events proved that Greece was still on the road and moving in the right general direction, despite obstacles in its internal politics and in its traditional foreign policy positions.

August 31, 1995

Glenn E. Curtis

Chapter 1. Historical Setting



Fresco representation of a priest-king in a Minoan palace at Knossos

THE BURDEN OF HISTORY lies heavily on Greece. In the early 1990s, as new subway tunnels were being excavated under Athens, Greece's museums were being filled to overflowing with the material remains of the past: remnants of houses from the Turkokratia (the era of Ottoman rule); coins and shops from the period of the Byzantine Empire; pottery remains from the Greek workshops that flourished during the Roman Empire; and graves, shrines, and houses from the classical period when Athens stood at the head of its own empire. The glories of ancient Greece and the splendor of the Christian Byzantine Empire give the modern Greeks a proud and rich heritage. The resilience and durability of Greek culture and traditions through times of turmoil provide a strong sense of cultural destiny. These elements also pose a considerable challenge to Greeks of the present: to live up to the legacies of the past. Much of the history of the modern state of Greece has witnessed a playing out of these contradictory forces.

An important theme in Greek history is the multiple identities of its civilization. Greece is both a Mediterranean country and a Balkan country. And, throughout its history, Greece has been a part of both the Near East and Western Europe. During the Bronze Age and again at the time of the Greek Renaissance of the eighth century B.C., Greece and the Near East were closely connected. The empire of Alexander the Great of Macedonia brought under Greek dominion a vast expanse of territory from the Balkans to the Indus. The Byzantine Empire, with its heart in Constantinople, bridged the continents of Europe and Asia. Greece's history is also closely intertwined with that of Europe and has been since Greek colonists settled the shores of Italy and Spain and Greek traders brought their wares to Celtic France in the seventh century B.C.

A second theme is the influence of the Greek diaspora. From the sixth century B.C., when Greeks settled over an expanse from the Caucasus to Gibraltar, until the dispersal of hundreds of thousands of Greeks to Australia and Canada during the 1950s and 1960s, Greeks have been on the move. The experience of the diaspora has been and continues to be a defining element in the development of Greece and Greek society.

The third major theme is the role of foreign dependence. Until 1832, the Greek nation had never existed as a single state. In antiquity, hundreds of states were inhabited by Greeks, so the Greek national identity transcended any one state. For much of their history, Greeks have been part of large, multiethnic states. Whether under the suzerainty of the emperors of Rome or the dominion of the Ottoman Empire (see Glossary), much of Greek history can only be understood in the context of foreign rule. In more recent times, the fortunes of Greece have been linked in integral ways to the struggles of the Great Powers in the nineteenth century and the polarizing diplomacy of the late twentieth-century Cold War. The history of Greece and the Greek people, then, is bound up with forces and developments on a scale larger than just southeastern Europe. To understand the history of Greece, one has to examine this complex interplay between indigenous development and foreign influences.

Earliest History

Migrations from the east brought the foundations of new civilizations to the Greek mainland, the island of Crete, and the Cyclades Islands east of the Peloponnesian Peninsula (more commonly known as the Peloponnesus; Greek form Peloponnisos). The Minoan civilization (in Crete) and the Mycenaean civilization (on the mainland) developed distinctive social structures that are documented in archaeological records. The dominant Mycenaean civilization then declined for a 250-year period known as the Dark Age of Greece.

The Stone Age

The earliest stages of settlement and social evolution occurred in Greece between 10,000 and 3000 B.C., building the foundation for major advances to begin shortly thereafter. Current evidence suggests that Greece was settled by people from the Near East, primarily Anatolia. But some historians argue that groups from Central Europe also moved into the area. Extensive archaeological remains of a number of farming villages of the Neolithic Era (the last period of the Stone Age, approximately 10,000 to 3000 B.C.) have been discovered in the plains of Thessaly in present-day east-central Greece (see fig. 7). Larger villages built between 3500 and 3000 B.C. show that in that period society was becoming more complex, and that an elite group was forming. Shortly thereafter, craft specialists began to appear, and the form of social organization shifted from tribalism to chiefdoms. Population increased in this period at a slow rate.

Meanwhile, the island of Crete (Kriti) was first inhabited around 6300 B.C. by people from Anatolia. These early groups brought with them a wide range of domesticated plants and animals. They settled at Knossos, which remained the only settlement on the island for centuries. Only in the final phase of the late Stone Age, did the civilization on Crete begin to advance, and only then did real farming villages appear in other parts of the island. The social structure remained tribal, but it set the stage for change.

The Origins of Civilization: 3200-1050 B.C.

The second millennium B.C. saw the evolution of two powerful Greek civilizations, the Minoan in Crete and the Mycenaean on the mainland. During the early Bronze Age (3000–2200 B.C.), major changes occurred in both Crete and mainland Greece. In both cases, there is evidence of rapid population growth associated with the establishment of trade connections across the Aegean Sea to Anatolia and the Near East. The Cyclades (Kiklades), islands between Crete and the mainland, were settled at this time and seem to have flourished as stepping stones between Europe and Asia. Both the Cyclades and the mainland developed complex societies featuring skilled craftsmen and political elites.

The Minoans

The civilization that developed in Crete is called Minoan after the mythical King Minos. The Minoan culture began producing sculpture and pottery in approximately 2600 B.C., inaugurating what was known as the prepalatial (early Minoan) period. Then about 2000 B.C., the Minoans began constructing the palaces that became their trademark. The palace-building protopalatial (middle Minoan) period, which lasted until about 1450 B.C., included flourishing economic, political, and social organization and active trade in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the first appearance of writing in the Greek world. In the latter part of this period, Minoan traders ventured as far west as Spain. The large, ornate palaces had a distinctive design, were built at population centers and were the scene of elaborate religious ceremonies. The destruction of many of the society's palaces by a severe earthquake began the postpalatial (late Minoan) period. In that period, the rival Mycenaean civilization took control of Crete's Mediterranean commerce, and by 1200 B.C. development of the Minoan culture had ceased.

The Mycenaeans

The civilization that took root on the mainland is called Mycenaean after the first major archaeological site where this culture was identified. The Mycenaeans, an Indo-European group, were the first speakers of the Greek language. They may have entered Greece at the end of the early Bronze Age, in the middle Bronze Age, or in the Neolithic period. The excavation of exceptionally wealthy graves, and the size and spacing of palace foundations, indicates that the Mycenaeans formed an elite and a chieftan-level society (one organized around the judicial and executive authority of a single figure, with varying degrees of power) by the late Bronze Age (ca. 1600 B.C.). Mycenaean palatial society was at its zenith in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries B.C. At some point in the middle of the fourteenth century, Mycenaeans, whose society stressed military excellence, conquered Knossos and the rest of Crete (see fig. 3).

The Mycenaeans employed a form of syllabic writing known as Linear B, which, unlike the Linear A developed by the Minoans, used the Greek language. It appears that the Mycenaeans used writing not to keep historical records but strictly as a device to register the flow of goods and produce into the palaces from a complex, highly centralized economy featuring regional networks of collection and distribution. Besides being at the center of such networks, palaces also controlled craft production and were the seat of political power.

Each palace on the mainland seems to have been an autonomous political entity, but the lack of historical records precludes knowledge about the interaction of the palatial centers. These small-scale polities stand in marked contrast to the huge contemporaneous states of the Near East. Archaeological findings in Egypt and the countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean Sea show that the Mycenaeans reached those points. Nevertheless, the Mycenaeans seemingly were able to avoid entanglement in the conflicts of the superpowers of the eastern Mediterranean, such as the Hittites and the Egyptians. They were content to be lords of the Aegean for a time. Between 1250 and 1150 B.C., a combination of peasant rebellions and internal warfare destroyed all the Mycenaean palace citadels. Some were reoccupied but on a much smaller scale, others disappeared forever. The precise circumstances of these events are unknown, but historians speculate that the top-heavy system, whose elite based their power solely on military might, contained the seeds of its own destruction.

The Dark Age, 1050-800 B.C.

During the late Bronze Age (1550–1200 B.C.), a confluence of events caused mainly by local factors brought about the downfall of all the major cultures of the Near East. Undoubtedly the earlier incidents of decay influenced the collapse that came later to some extent, but other factors were usually the primary causes. As it affected Greece, this phenomenon is commonly called the Dark Age; it extended approximately from 1050 to 800 B.C.

The art of writing was largely lost after the fall of the Mycenaean palaces, so the only documentary source for this time is the work of the poet Homer, who wrote in the ninth century B.C. The period generally was one of stagnation and cultural decline. The disruption that followed the collapse of the Mycenaean palaces was great. Groups of people migrated to different areas, and the population declined, probably reaching its nadir in the tenth century B.C.

Archaeological records indicate that in the Dark Age most people lived in small communities in remote areas supported by subsistence farming. Organizationally Greece was a chiefdom society. Most trade and contacts with cultures in the Near East and elsewhere lapsed.

The Era of the Polis

As early as 900 B.C., Greece again expanded contacts with civilizations to the east, and Greek civilization became more complex. The rise of empires, most notably the Athenian Empire, brought a more sophisticated economy, trade, colonization, and war.

The Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.

Developments in the eighth century B.C. enabled states to reemerge. The ports of Argos and Corinth, on the eastern shore of the Peloponnesus, grew very fast, trade with the Near

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Figure 3. Centers of Mycenaean Civilization, ca. 1400 B.C.

East began to flourish, and increased domestic production enabled a new, wealthy elite to rise. Commercial activity centered on the acquisition of metals from the Near East for the manufacture of luxury goods. In this process, the Greeks came in contact with and adopted the alphabet of the Phoenicians, as well as other innovations that accelerated change in Greek civilization.

Colonies in the Mediterranean

Between 750 and 500 B.C., the Greeks founded colonies in many parts of the Mediterranean Basin and the Black Sea, beginning to exert their cultural influence, which remains in these regions to the present day. Around 730 B.C., permanent Greek colonies were established, based on the metals trade at Ischia and Pithecusai on the coast of Italy. Shortly thereafter, Corinth sent out agricultural settlers to Corfu (Kerkira) off the coast of northwest Greece and to Syracuse on Sicily. These settlements set the trend for the earliest colonization movement to the west. Southern Italy and Sicily became known as Magna Graecia (Great Greece) because of the extent and density of colonization that followed the initial ventures.

More than 150 colonies were established in Italy, along the coast of northern Greece, in the Bosporus, and on the Black Sea coast. The chief incentive for colonization was the need for additional land for agriculture and living space to accommodate population growth; colonies established by other civilizations, such as Miletus in Asia Minor, also challenged the Greeks to expand.

The Rise of Athens and Sparta

The concept of the polis (city-state) began to evolve with the development of aristocratic clans to replace chiefdoms. Clan rivalries yielded single powerful figures who were termed tyrants because they achieved domination in outright power struggles within the aristocratic group and among clan centers. Because they often were marginal clan members, the success of the tyrants created a new criterion for power: ability rather than birth. This change was a crucial element in the development of the polis, which came to be a politically unified community covering an average of 200 square kilometers and based on a small urban center. When the tyrants were overthrown after one to three generations, the institutionalized structure they created remained and became an important legacy to the modern world.

In the eighth century and early seventh century B.C., Sparta began to develop as a militant polis with a rigid social structure and a government that included an assembly representing all citizens. Meanwhile, Athens became the largest polis, combining several regions of the peninsula of Attica. Under the leadership of the aristocrat Solon, Athens developed a social system in which power was based on wealth rather than aristocratic birth. Citizens of various wealth categories were allotted different positions of power. Thus, in different ways Sparta and Athens built states that included wider sectors of society in their political activity than had any previous society, and the basis of democracy was laid.

The Persian Wars

The consolidation of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great in the sixth century B.C. posed a major threat to the fledgling states of Greece. The resolution of the clash between East and West was to shape the entire future of the region. For the Greeks, it was a question of survival; for the Persians, on the other hand, occupation of Greece was simply part of their imperial plan. Nonetheless, the Persian Wars are significant because they resulted in a separation between Greece and the Near East after centuries of fruitful interaction.

The First Persian War in 490 B.C. was a brief affair. Intending to punish Athens for its participation in a raid in Asia Minor, Persia sent a small force by Persian standards, about 20,000 infantry and 800 cavalry. The Greeks met this force with 10,000 troops at the plain of Marathon on the west coast of Attica. The combination of Greek tactics, the superiority of their armor, and the new phalanx formation proved decisive in the battle; the Persians were routed.

The Second Persian War of 481-479 B.C. was a very different proposition. Persia's king, Xerxes, planned to lead a huge expedition to conquer all the Greek states. The Greeks formed the Hellenic League, which included Sparta and its allied states. Other Greek states went over to the Persian side.

In 480 B.C., Xerxes invaded Greece with a huge fleet and an army of over 100,000 men. After overcoming fierce Spartan resistance at Thermopilai, the Persians occupied central Greece and the Greeks retreated south to the Peloponnesus. All of Attica was captured and Athens sacked. On the seas, however, the Greeks completely destroyed the Persian fleet in the Bay of Salamis. Xerxes retreated hastily to Asia, then suffered a great land defeat the next year at the Battle of Plataia, in which the superiority of Greek armor and tactics was the deciding factor. Persian expansionism never threatened Greece again.

The most important result of the Persian Wars was a barrier between Greece and the Near East that ruptured a vibrant cultural zone including Phoenicia, Lydia, Egypt, and other cultures of the Near East. The barrier would not be broken until the middle of the next century, and the concept of a divided Asia and Europe became permanent.

The Athenian Empire

Once the Persian menace had been removed, petty squabbling began amongst the members of the Hellenic League.



Theater at Epidaurus, known for its unusually fine acoustics, built fourth century B.C. Courtesy Peter J. Kassander

Sparta, feeling that its job was completed, left the association, and Athens assumed domination of the league. Under the leadership of Themistocles and Kimon, Athens reformed the alliance into a new body called the Delian League. By using monetary contributions from other member states to build its own military forces, Athens essentially transformed the Hellenic League into its own empire.

In the 450s B.C., Pericles (ca. 495–429 B.C.), known as the greatest statesman of ancient Greece, laid the foundation of imperial rule. Athens set the level of tribute for the member states, which were now subject to its dictates, and it dealt harshly with failures to pay. Athens also began regulating the internal policy of the other states and occasionally garrisoning soldiers there. At its height in the 440s B.C., the Athenian Empire was composed of 172 tribute-paying states. Athens now controlled the Aegean.

The enormous wealth entering Athens from subject states financed the flourishing of democratic institutions, literature, art, and architecture that came to be known as the golden age of Athens. Pericles built great architectural monuments, including the Parthenon, to employ workers and symbolize the majesty of Athens. The four greatest Greek playwrights— Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Euripides, and Sophocles—wrote during the golden age.

In society and government, lower-class Athenians were able to improve their social position by obtaining land in the subject states. Pericles gave more governing power to bodies that represented the citizenship as a whole, known as the demos. For the first time, men were paid to participate in government organizations and sit on juries. Many states outside the empire felt quite threatened by the growth of Athens, creating a volatile situation in the mid-fifth century B.C.

The Peloponnesian War

Hostility toward Athens brought about the longest war of antiquity, the Peloponnesian War (also called the Great Peloponnesian War to distinguish it from an earlier conflict in the Peloponnesus between 460 and 445 B.C.). In 431 B.C., Athens faced a loose alliance headed by Sparta (see fig. 4). The first phase of the war (431–421 B.C.) pitted the most powerful fleet in the Mediterranean (Athens) against one of the strongest armies ever assembled in the ancient world. In this phase, Athens abandoned the countryside of Attica to the invading Spartans, who reinvaded Attica every year, attempting to force the surrender of the population within the city walls. After neither strategy gained a decisive advantage, a peace was signed in 421 B.C.

The second phase began in 414 B.C., when Sparta repulsed an Athenian invasion of Sicily. With aid from Persia, Sparta built a large navy that finally destroyed the Athenian navy in 404 B.C. at Aigispotamoi. Thus ended the Athenian Empire and the golden age.

The Polis in Decline, 400-335 B.C.

Following the collapse of Athens, Sparta controlled an empire that encompassed much of present-day Greece. Sparta's tenure as head of the empire was shortened, however, by a combination of poor leadership, wars with Persia and with Sparta's former allies, and social weakness at home. Sparta suffered a drastic shortage of manpower, and society neared revolution because of the huge amounts of wealth falling into the hands of a few. Thebes, Thessaly, and a resurgent Athens were able to carve out small domains for themselves because of Spartan ineptitude. In the next fifty years, however, Sparta's rivals



Source: Based on information from William R. Shepherd, Historical Atlas, New York, 1962, 17.

Figure 4. Greece at the Beginning of the Peloponnesian War, 431 B.C.

obtained only temporary advantages over other ambitious states. Thebes, for example, crushed the Spartan army at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., dominated the peninsula for ten years, then declined rapidly.

In the fourth century B.C., many Greek states suffered bloody class struggles over money and land. During this conflict, the kings of Persia contributed large amounts of money to whichever side would provide the best advantage to Persian interests.

Hellenistic Greece

Weakness in the established states promoted the rise of a new power, Macedonia, under the inspired military leadership of Alexander the Great. Alexander left no legacy of stable governance, however, and the Macedonian Empire that he created fragmented shortly after his death into a shifting collection of minor states.

Philip II of Macedonia

On the fringes of the Greek world, Macedonia's people spoke a form of Greek, but the country had different customs and social organization. Macedonia had not followed its southern neighbors in the evolution of the polis, but had retained a chiefdom form of society in which local headmen still wielded considerable power. In a period of twenty-five years, however, Macedonia became the largest empire yet in antiquity, solely as a result of the genius of Philip II and his son, Alexander. A man of exceptional energy, diplomatic skill, and ruthlessness, Philip totally reformed the Macedonian army when he came to power in 359 B.C. Wielding this new weapon, he conquered all the peoples of the southern Balkans, culminating in the defeat of Athens and Thebes in 338. As he was planning to invade Asia, Philip was assassinated in 336. The task of expanding the empire eastward was left to his son.

The Fire from Heaven: Alexander the Great

At the death of his father, the twenty-year-old Alexander became king. A natural warrior, he also received a formal education under the philosopher Aristotle. Alexander lived only thirteen years after his accession to the throne, but in that time he created the largest empire ever seen, and he had perhaps a greater impact on Western civilization than any other man of the ancient world. As with many great men, his life is shrouded in myth and legend.

In 334 B.C., after securing his base in Greece, Alexander invaded Asia Minor with 30,000 troops, quickly capturing the Turkish coastline to deprive the Persian fleet of its ports. Using brilliant tactics, he then defeated a much larger Persian army under Darius in a series of battles in northern Syria. Alexander then captured Egypt and Mesopotamia, defeating 100,000 Persians in a climactic battle at Guagamela in 331 B.C. Before dying of a malarial fever at age thirty-three, Alexander conquered Afghanistan and parts of India as well.

Alexander used both military and administrative skills to build his empire. He was able to integrate the various peoples he had conquered into a unified empire by devising appropriate forms of administration in each region. In Egypt he became the pharaoh. In Mesopotamia he became the great king. In Persia, however, he kept the indigenous administrative system intact under joint Persian and Macedonian rule. He founded hundreds of new settlements, encouraging his men to marry local women. And he manipulated the local religions to legitimize his own rule. In creating his empire, Alexander changed the face of the world.

The Hellenistic Monarchies

Alexander's death resulted in a twenty-year power struggle that divided his empire into several parts, including mainland Greece and Macedonia, Syria and Mesopotamia, and Egypt. By 280 B.C., new Hellenistic monarchies, whose leaders ruled by force and lacked Alexander's organizational ability, were fighting each other and suffering internal struggles as well.

In this period, parts of Greece were able to achieve some degree of autonomy within confederacies or leagues, most of which were governed by oligarchies. As the leagues became dominant, smaller political units, such as Athens, lost most of their political power. In this process, states of larger size and greater complexity replaced the polis.

The Hellenistic kingdoms mingled elements of Greek culture with Near Eastern cultures. Some of the kings founded colonies to establish garrisons in foreign territory, and in such places intermarriage between Greeks and non-Greeks became common. The Greek language spread and was used as the lingua franca for culture, commerce, and administration throughout the Near East. Greek art forms also became prevalent in



The temple of Apollo at Corinth, ca. sixth century B.C. Courtesy Jean R. Tartter

the region. The old rigid form of social organization characteristic of the polis was discarded. Greek towns were now a part of a larger entity, based not on kinship or residence but on power and control. A new power elite arose, made wealthy by the conquests of vast new territories and the payment of tribute. At the same time, peasants suffered greatly from higher levies to support the upper class. The weakness of the agricultural producers, combined with constant warfare among kingdoms, made the Greeks vulnerable to a new Mediterranean power, Rome.

Greece in the Roman Empire

Over a period of about 250 years, Greek territory gradually was incorporated into the Roman Empire. The Greek and Roman worlds each changed significantly because of the interaction that resulted.

The Conquest of Greece

As the constant military conflicts of the Hellenistic kingdoms raised revenue needs, the tax burden on both rural and urban populations rose. Meanwhile, the Persians, Parthians, and Bactrians threatened from the east; and Roman expansionism in southern Italy and the western Mediterranean set the stage for repeated clashes between Rome and various Hellenistic rulers. The vibrancy, resilience, and resourcefulness of the Roman Republic finally proved to be too much for the fragile kingdoms of the East.

In the fourth and third centuries B.C., military conquests in central Italy brought Rome into direct competition with the city colonies of Magna Graecia in southern Italy, especially Tarentum (Taranto) and Syracuse. In 280 B.C., Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, began a long period of confrontation between the Greeks and the Romans when he fought a series of battles against the Romans in southern Italy. In this period, however, Rome's major adversary in the Mediterranean was the powerful empire of Carthage, just across the Mediterranean in modern Tunisia, with which Rome fought the Punic Wars over a period of forty-five years. Greek forces also became involved in the campaigns of the Punic Wars, setting the stage for future conflicts with Rome.

The most important episode occurred during the Second Punic War (218–207 B.C.). Campaigning in Italy, the Carthaginian leader Hannibal allied with Philip V of Macedonia, then the most powerful ruler in the Balkans, to protect supply lines from North Africa. Rome responded by supporting Philip's many enemies in the Balkans as they fought the First Macedonian War (215–213 B.C.), which expanded Roman interests into the Balkans. In the Second Macedonian War (200–197 B.C.), Rome's first major military expedition into the Greek world met with brilliant success. Philip lost all his territory outside Macedonia, and the victorious commander Flamininus established a Roman protectorate over the "liberated" Greek city-states. The fortunes of Greece and Rome were henceforth intertwined for about the next 500 years.

The final incorporation of Greece and the Greek East into the Roman Empire came in 31 B.C. after the Battle of Actium, on the western shore of Greece. There, rule of the Roman Empire was settled when the Roman emperor Octavian defeated the navy of Mark Antony. Because Antony had based his land forces in Greece, the victory of Octavian made the Greek world an integral and permanent part of the Roman Empire. The yoke of empire on Greece was relatively light, however, and many Greek cities approved the new order. Rome demanded only two things from its Greek holdings—security and revenue.

Creation of the Graeco-Roman World

The period from 31 B.C. until the death of Marcus Aurelius in A.D. 180 is often referred to as the era of the Pax Romana, or Roman Peace—a phenomenon that actually occurred only in the central areas of the empire, including Greece and the Greek East. The peace and security of the first two centuries A.D. promoted a cultural flowering and economic growth in the Greek world, as well as integration of Greeks into the ruling elite of the empire.

Peninsular Greece was divided into two provinces: Achaia, incorporating central and southern Greece, and Macedonia, which included Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia proper. Because these provinces were not required to support Roman occupation forces, their fiscal burdens were relatively modest. Greek cities became the financial, economic, and administrative core of the eastern reaches of the empire. The first result of this role was economic growth and prosperity—Greek cities such as Athens, Corinth, Alexandria, Miletus, Thessaloniki, and Smyrna flourished as both producers and commercial centers. From this settled prosperity, an urban Greek elite arose.

Decentralized Roman provincial administration created spaces for local men to rise in power and status, and, beginning with the reign of Emperor Vespasian (A.D. 69–78), significant numbers of Greeks even entered the Roman Senate. At the same time, life in Greek cities incorporated Roman features, and new generations of "Romanized" Greek citizens appeared. An example of such new Greek citizens was Herodes Atticus, a fabulously wealthy financier and landowner from Athens, who rose to be consul of Rome in A.D. 143, and whose bequests still adorn his home city.

On the other hand, several Roman emperors such as Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius actively embraced Greek culture and traditions, encouraging the hellenization of Roman culture. Together, Latin and Greek became the dominant languages of the empire. Literature, art, oratory, rhetoric, education, and architecture all drew on Hellenic roots from the age of the Greek polis. During the Pax Romana, Greece and Greek culture were a vital part of the Roman Empire.

Constantine and the Rise of Christianity

By the second century A.D., Christianity and Hellenism had come into close contact in the eastern Mediterranean. In the early fourth century, the policies of Emperor Constantine the Great institutionalized the connection and lent a lasting Greek influence to the church that emerged.

Although Christianity was initially practiced within Semitic populations of the Roman Empire, by the first century A.D. Greeks also had learned of the teachings of Christ. In that period, the epistles of Paul to the Ephesians and the Corinthians and his preachings to the Athenians were all aimed at a Greek audience. Other early Christian theological writers such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen attempted to fuse Christian belief with Greek philosophy, establishing the Greek world as the home of gentile Christianity.

A combination of internal turmoil and the threat of invasion by various nomadic tribes to the north and east led to a crisis in the third century. The Germanic Heruli sacked Athens in A.D. 267. The Goths, the Alemanni, the Franks, and the Vandals all made significant incursions into the empire. In the east, the Sassanians revived the moribund Persian Empire and defeated Roman armies several times during the third century.

The chaos of the third century raised deep social and economic problems throughout the empire. Taxes increased to expand the army, driving the peasantry further into poverty. The economy nearly collapsed as the coinage was devalued to provide the vast amounts of metal needed to pay the army. Inflation was rampant. Manpower was scarce because of huge military losses, plagues, and the weakened condition of the peasantry. Such traumas set the Latin West and the Greek East onto separate historical trajectories. The urban centers of the East, built upon the structure of the old Greek polis, endured the crises much better than the other areas of the empire.

The reigns of Diocletian and Constantine mark a critical turning point in the fortunes of the empire. Constantine became emperor of Rome in A.D. 305. He built on the foundations laid by his predecessor, Diocletian, and consolidated the empire after a chaotic third century in which the average reign of a Roman emperor was less than five years. The reforms that Diocletian and Constantine introduced brought temporary stability. Diocletian responded to geographic fragmentation by dividing the empire into two major parts to be ruled by separate emperors. Constantine's Edict of Milan, issued in 313, established the empire's toleration of Christianity; his personal conversion continued over a number of years.

In 330 Constantine advanced the separation of the eastern and western empires by establishing his capital at Byzantium and renaming it Constantinople. In 364 the empire was officially split. The western empire was to be ruled from Rome, the eastern from Constantinople. For those in the eastern territory that had been dominated by the tradition of the polis, the transition from a Latin Roman empire to a Greek Byzantine empire was an easy one. Constantinople inherited the cultural wealth of the Greek city-state as a solid foundation and a symbol of civilization in its empire.

The Byzantine Empire

The Byzantine Empire was established with the foundation of Constantinople, but the final separation of the eastern and western empires was not complete until the late fifth century. With its political structure anchored in Greek tradition and a new religion stimulated by Greek philosophy, the Byzantine Empire survived a millennium of triumphs and declines until Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 (see fig. 5).

Separation from Rome

Two crises between A.D. 330 and 518 helped shape the Greek part of the empire. The first was the invasion by barbarian Huns, Visigoths, and Ostrogoths in the fifth century. Constantinople averted the fate of Rome, which fell to similar onslaughts, by a combination of skillful bribery and a strong army. Thus, as the West was carved into minor kingdoms, the East remained largely intact, and the balance of power in the former Roman Empire moved conclusively to the East.

The second major crisis was religious in nature. In the East, great heresies such as Arianism, Nestorianism, and Monophysitism drew on the rich Greek metaphysical tradition and clashed with the emerging Roman Catholic Church in the fourth and fifth centuries. Among the challengers was an eastern branch of the church with Greek as its language, closely bound to the political world of Constantinople. The Greek Orthodox Christian empire established at this time would bridge Asia and Europe for centuries.



Figure 5. The Byzantine Empire, Early Eleventh Century

Justinian and the Empire of the East

Justinian (r. A.D. 527–65) laid the foundation on which the Byzantine Empire would rest for nearly a century. An ambitious and dynamic leader, he greatly expanded the empire's territory by conquering the southern Levant, northern Africa, and Italy, in an effort to recreate the domain of the old Roman Empire. Justinian's administrative reforms created a centralized bureaucracy, a new fiscal system, and a provincial administration. The codes of Roman law were revised and unified in the Justinianic Code, which remains to this day a cornerstone of European jurisprudence. These reforms greatly advanced the unification of the diverse peoples of the empire in a Hellenic context. In the end, Justinian's institutional reforms proved far more lasting than his military conquests.

The Decline of the Empire, 565-867

Justinian's wars brought the empire to the verge of bankruptcy and left it in a vulnerable military position. Threats from both East and West plunged the empire into a spiral of decline that lasted for nearly 300 years. The first menace from the East came from the Persian Sassanid Empire. Sassanid forces took Palestine, Syria, and Egypt, and even threatened Constantinople at one point. A more serious threat soon developed with the advent of Islamic expansionism. Exploding out of the Arabian Peninsula, Muslim forces swept northward and westward, taking Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. Portions of Asia Minor were wrested from the Byzantine Empire, and twice between A.D. 668 and 725 Constantinople was nearly overrun by Muslim forces.

The other major threat to the empire came from the West. During the late sixth and seventh centuries, Slavic peoples began to invade the Balkan Peninsula. Major cities such as Athens, Thebes, and Thessaloniki were safe behind defensible walls. Much of the indigenous population of the Balkans, Greeks included, fled, especially to Calabria at the southern tip of Italy, or relocated their settlements to higher, more secure regions of the Balkans. Under these conditions, urban centers no longer were the basis of Byzantine society in the Balkans.

But the Slavic arrivals were unable to preserve their own distinct cultural identities; very soon their hellenization process began. Greek remained the mother tongue of the region, and Christianity remained the dominant faith. Although the Slavic invasions and Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries shrank the Byzantine state, it survived as a recognizable entity grounded more firmly than ever in the Balkans and Asia Minor.

Revival and Collapse, 867-1453

When a new dynasty, which came to be called Macedonian, took the throne of the Byzantine Empire in 867, its forces began to roll back the tide of Islamic expansion. Antioch, Syria, Georgia, and Armenia were reconquered. The Byzantine fleet regained Crete and drove Muslim pirates from the Aegean Sea, reopening it to commercial traffic. Consolidation of the Balkans was completed with the defeat of the Bulgarian Empire by Basil II in 1018.

Orthodox missionaries, including Cyril and Methodius, led the proselytization of Bulgaria, Serbia, and eventually Russia. The military conquests of the Macedonian Dynasty initiated a period of economic growth and prosperity and a cultural renaissance. Agriculture flourished as conditions stabilized, and, as emperors increasingly used land grants to reward military service, the area under cultivation expanded. The prosperity of improved agricultural conditions and the export of woven silk and other craft articles allowed the population to grow. Expanding commercial opportunities increased the influence of the nearby Italian maritime republics of Venice, Genoa, and Amalfi, which eventually gained control of the Mediterranean trade routes into Greece.

The prosperity of the Macedonian Dynasty was followed by a period of decline. In the late eleventh century, a Norman army, allied with the pope and commanded by Robert Guiscard, ravaged parts of Greece, including Thebes and Corinth. Civil war among rival military factions impaired the empire's ability to respond to such incursions. In a disastrous loss at Manzikert (in present-day eastern Turkey) in 1071, Seljuk Turks from Central Asia captured Romanus IV, one of the first rulers after the end of the Macedonian Dynasty. Through the next century, the empire became more and more a European domain. The worst humiliation came in 1204, when marauders of the Fourth Crusade plundered Constantinople, carrying off many of its greatest treasures.

Greece was carved up into tiny kingdoms and principalities ruled by Western princes. Venice gained control of substantial parts of Greece, some of which were not relinquished until 1797. Architectural remains from the Venetian period are still visible in the Greek countryside and ports.

Only the actions of the Palaeologus Dynasty (1261–1453) prevented the empire from falling. The Palaeologi recaptured Constantinople and most of the southern Balkans, but the end of the empire was not long delayed. A new force, the Ottoman Turks, arose from the east in the wake of the Mongol invasion led by Genghis Khan in 1221. Late in the fourteenth century, Asia Minor and the Balkans fell to the Ottoman Turks, but Constantinople still held out. Finally the forces of Mehmet the Conqueror took the capital city after a lengthy siege. Constantinople would again be the center of a Mediterranean empire stretching from Vienna to the Caspian Sea and from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Gibraltar—but now it would be as a Muslim city in the empire of the Ottomans. The great Greek Byzantine Empire had come to an end.

The Ottoman Era

When Constantinople fell in 1453, the Ottoman conquest of the Orthodox Balkans was assured. By that time, most of peninsular Greece was already in Ottoman hands. The other remaining bastions of Hellenism held out for a short time longer. The kingdom of Trabzon (Trebizond), at the southeast corner of the Black Sea, fell in 1461. During the sixteenth century, the Ottomans took Rhodes (Rodos) and Chios (Khios) in the Dodecanese Islands (Dodekanisos), Naxos in the Cyclades, and Cyprus. In 1669 the island of Crete capitulated after a lengthy siege. Only the Ionian Islands west of the Greek Peninsula remained outside the Ottoman sultan's grip; instead, they were part of Venice's expanding empire. The Greek world would remain an integral part of the Ottoman Empire until 1821, when one small portion broke away and formed an independent state. But a significant part of the Greek population would remain Ottoman until 1922.

The Nature of Ottoman Rule

The Ottoman state was a theocracy, based on strict notions of hierarchy and order, with the sultan exercising absolute, divine-right power at its pinnacle. The system first divided subject peoples into the domain of the faithful, the Muslims, and the domain of war, the non-Muslims. An individual's obligations and rights were determined by position in one of these groups. Conversion by foreign subjects to Islam was possible, but the Ottomans did not demand it. Instead, further religionbased classifications were used to rule the subject population.


The non-Muslim community was divided into *millets* (see Glossary), administrative units organized on the basis of religious affiliation rather than ethnic origin. Accordingly, the four non-Muslim *millets* were Armenian, Catholic, Jewish, and Orthodox; the last was the largest and most influential. The *millets* enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy. At the head of each was a religious leader responsible for the welfare of the *millet* and for its obedience to the sultan. The head of the Orthodox *millet* was the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. The patriarch's position as *ethnarch*, or leader of the nation, also gave him substantial secular powers. This combination meant that the institution of the Orthodox Church played a vital role in the development of Greek society during the Ottoman era.

In practice, the extent of the empire made control dependent on a complex, decentralized administrative hierarchy. Living on their estates, designated local military leaders, the *sipahi*, assumed many of the responsibilities of local rule. Over time, the estates became hereditary and stopped serving their intended function. In Greek territory, this policy left massive landholdings controlled by the Ottoman Turks and worked by dependent Greek peasants.

As the sipahi system broke down, a form of provincial administration took its place. The empire was divided into regions that were governed by pashas, who in turn subdivided their realms into smaller units overseen by beys. The Orthodox millet included two types of local government. Ottoman officials and religious judges adjudicated civil and criminal cases involving Muslims and Orthodox citizens. Orthodox priests and Christian primates collected taxes, settled disputes, and effectively governed at the local level. At times the two systems competed, and at times they operated in coordination; the result was complexity, abuse, and cynicism. In this atmosphere, people sought security in direct patronage relationships with individuals in power. The Ottoman system discriminated against the non-Muslim population by imposing special levies of money and labor, and various restrictions were placed on personal freedom. In court, testimony of a Muslim would always be accepted over that of a non-Muslim. Marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims were illegal. Most hated of all was the forced conscription of male children for service in military or civil service. The burden on the subject population became even heavier and more capricious when the empire began suffering military defeats by Russia in the eighteenth century.

Some parts of Greece were able to escape the direct effects of Ottoman rule. The remote mountains of central Greece, for example, were called the Agrapha, the "unwritten", because the empire had no census or tax records for the region. Other areas were granted special status because they filled particular needs of the empire. Beginning in the late seventeenth century, the Phanariotes, a group of Greek merchant families in Constantinople, gained bureaucratic power by serving the sultan as diplomats and interpreters. In the eighteenth century, the Phanariotes were appointed *hospodars*, or princes, of the Romanian provinces Moldavia and Wallachia.

The official role given the Orthodox Church in the *millet* system made its situation in Greek society paradoxical. On the one hand, it helped to keep the Greek language alive and used its traditional educational role to pass on the Greek cultural heritage and foster a sense of cultural identity. On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities expected the church to maintain order. The church became a very conservative institution that protected its role by isolating Greeks from the great intellectual currents of the West, first the Reformation and later the



Remains of a Turkish mosque, Metsovon, Epirus Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

Enlightenment. Secular influences first touched Greek society not in Greece but in the communities of the diaspora.

As the feudal system crumbled, control over such a vast domain became increasingly problematic. Because a standing army would have been prohibitively expensive, non-Muslims were assigned as *armatoliks*, or armed guards, of specified areas and paid from local taxes. This system was abused flagrantly by independent groups of armed men, some with official sanction and some without, who roamed the countryside and abused the peasant population. Myths have turned the bandits into proto-revolutionaries, but to contemporaries in Greece and elsewhere, they were a force to be feared.

The Greek Diaspora

During the years of Ottoman domination, Greek speakers resettled over a wide area inside and outside the empire.

Greeks moved in large numbers to Romania, along the coast of the Black Sea, and into all the major cities of the empire and became merchants and artisans. Over 80,000 Greek families, for example, moved into the territories of the Habsburg Empire. Thousands more settled in the cities of the Russian Empire. Commercial dealings between the Ottoman Empire and the outside world were increasingly monopolized by Greeks. Important merchant colonies were founded in Trieste, Venice, Livorno, Naples, and Marseilles. Amsterdam, Antwerp, London, Liverpool, and Paris also received sizeable Greek populations.

The diaspora communities played a vital role in the development of Greek culture during the Ottoman occupation. Greek enclaves in foreign cultures reinforced national identity while exposing their inhabitants to new intellectual currents, including the ideology of revolution. Many diaspora Greeks became wealthy, then helped to support communities in Greece by founding schools and other public institutions.

Out of the Ottoman Empire

After gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire early in the nineteenth century, Greece became a monarchy ruled by representatives of European royal houses. Domestic politics and relations with neighbor states began a pattern of persistent turmoil.

The Conditions for Revolution

The modern state of Greece came into existence as a result of a protracted, bloody war against the Ottoman Empire between the years 1821 and 1832. The significance of the Greek War of Independence transcends the bounds of Greece and its history. It was the first major war of liberation after the American Revolution; it was the first successful war for independence from the Ottoman Empire; it was the first explicitly nationalist revolution; and it provided a model for later nationalist struggles.

The Greek War of Independence was the result of several factors. The ideology of a specifically Greek national consciousness, which had earlier roots, developed at an accelerated pace in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. The uprising of 1821 followed other Greek efforts to confront Ottoman rule directly. The most important of these events was the Orlov Rebellion of 1778–79. Inspired by the belief that Russia's war with the Turks signaled that country's readiness to liberate all the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, a short-lived uprising took place in the Peloponnesus beginning in February 1778. Under the ostensible leadership of the Russian Orlov brothers, the venture quickly failed because of poor organization and the lack of a coherent ideology, rapidly degenerating into looting and pillaging by both sides, but it set a precedent for violent resistance to Ottoman rule. The Orlov Rebellion also prompted oppressive measures by the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) that increased resentment against the empire.

The intellectual basis of nationalism came from the affluent and prominent diaspora Greeks of the eighteenth century. The two most prominent leaders of this group were Adamantios Korais and Rigas Velestinlis. Korais, primarily an educator, advocated the education of Greeks about their ancient heritage as the path toward emancipation. He played no active role in founding the modern Greek state. The fiery revolutionary Velestinlis wrote a blueprint for a new Greek state that would arise from the ashes of revolution against the empire. He was executed by the Turks in 1798.

In 1821 Greece met three major requirements for a successful revolution: material conditions among the populace were adverse enough to stimulate mass support for action; an ideological framework gave direction to the movement; and an organizational structure was present to coordinate the movement. Greek intellectuals had provided the language and ideas necessary for a nationalist struggle. And episodes such as the Orlov Rebellion provided a collective memory of violent resistance that made action feasible. During the 1810s, the other two conditions developed, then all three converged in the early 1820s.

The economy of the Ottoman Empire was seriously damaged by the general depression of commerce that followed the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815. Near-famine conditions prevailed in most of the Balkan Peninsula, but the problem was not addressed at any level of Ottoman government, and resentment grew among the rural populace. The Greek movement also developed organizational leadership during the 1810s. The Filiki Etaireia, or Society of Friends, founded in Odessa in 1814, was the most important of many clandestine revolutionary groups that arose. Unlike other such groups, it was able to attract a substantial membership while remaining undetected by Ottoman authorities. The organization brought together men from many levels of society to provide an organizational base for the dissemination of revolutionary ideas and for coordinated action. By 1820, then, only a spark was required to set the revolution ablaze.

The War of Independence

Despite decades of intellectual and logistical preparation, in actuality the Greek struggle for independence demonstrated little unity among supporting elements. Only the intervention of European powers protecting their own geopolitical interests ensured the emergence of a new Greek state. For nearly a century thereafter, Greek policy remained preoccupied with the many Greeks still under Ottoman rule after the postwar settlement.

Phase One of the Struggle

The precipitating factor in the Greek War of Independence was the revolt of the brigand Ali Pasha, the most infamous of the local Ottoman authorities who profited from the weakening control of Constantinople over its empire. Called the Lion of Ioannina (a city in northwest Greece), Ali rebelled against Sultan Mahmud II by building a sizeable and wealthy personal fiefdom that threatened the sultan's rule in the southern Balkans. In 1820 Mahmud's decision to curb Ali ignited a civil war that provided the opportunity for the Filiki Etaireia and its leader Alexandros Ipsilantis to launch a Greek uprising.

As it developed, the revolution was pursued by various groups with a multiplicity of goals and interests throughout the region, united by a crude plan of action. Hostilities were to begin in and focus on Moldavia and Wallachia to the north, where Ipsilantis and his army of 4,500 men were located. Once these areas had been liberated, the rest would follow. Shortly after Ipsilantis crossed the Prut River from Russian Moldavia into Ottoman territory in March 1821, the uprising spread throughout much of the peninsula. A second front opened within weeks, when Bishop Germanos of Patras raised the flag of revolution at a monastery in the Peloponnesus. The rapid defeat of Ipsilantis in the summer of 1821 shifted the war permanently to the south.

From the beginning, the cohesiveness of the Greek revolution was limited by class differences. The chief goal of the Greek upper classes was to rid society of the Turks, the military classes sought independent enclaves for themselves in imitation of Ali Pasha, and the lower orders simply desired to escape taxation, increase their property, and move up the social scale. Diaspora Greeks also returned home with dreams of a resurrected democratic past. Keeping these competing and disparate interests together proved one of the greatest challenges of the war.

The first of the war's two phases, from March 1821 to December 1823, was largely a successful insurgency. During this period, the Greek forces were able to capture many major strongholds of the Peloponnesus and establish a strong presence in central Greece. Victories on land were coupled with successes at sea, most notably the sinking of the flagship of the Ottoman navy in November 1822. Total casualties in the first phase have been estimated at 50,000, many of whom were civilians massacred by both sides.

In spite of the rebels' early victories, political stabilization eluded them. After an initial congress in 1821, which formed a government under a new constitution, factionalism soon led to the creation of rival governments. In April 1823, the Second National Congress selected a new government, under the presidency of Petrobey Mavromihalis, which became the third body claiming legitimate rule over the Greek people. The lack of political unity, which at times degenerated into actual civil war, was to prove very costly.

The Greek War of Independence touched a chord in Western Europe. Figures such as the British romantic poet Lord Byron found a "noble cause" in the Greek struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Philhellenes, as these sympathizers came to be called, played a critical role in the war. The conflict attracted the physical, monetary, and moral support of a variety of West European idealists. The Philhellenes raised money to support the insurgents, and they focused the attention of the outside world on the conflict until the powers of Western Europe decided to intervene.

Phase Two of the Struggle

The second phase of the war spanned the years 1824 to 1828. When a counteroffensive by the Porte overcame the feuding Greek forces in 1825, the rebels lost the advantage they had gained in the first phase. In the mid- to late 1820s, the sultan enlisted the assistance of Mahomet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, to launch a two-pronged attack. The sultan's forces marched from the north while the army of Mahomet Ali established a base at Messini on the south shore of the Peloponnesus and then advanced northward. Caught between two superior forces, the Greek armies relinquished all the gains made in the first years of the war. The fall of the fortress at Mesolongion in the spring of 1826 gave the Ottoman forces control of western Greece and of the Gulf of Patras; the fall of Athens later that year restored all of central Greece to Ottoman control. At that point, with the Balkan conflagration close to extinction, the powers of Western Europe intervened.

Western Intervention

In European Great Power politics after the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, maintenance of the status quo was the first priority. In such an atmosphere, the attention of the Great Powers (primarily France and Britain) could be drawn most quickly by situations that disrupted their common economic interests. Indeed, in 1823 the war in Greece had already begun curtailing commerce in the eastern Mediterranean, but the European powers realized that the defeat of the Ottoman Empire would leave a power vacuum over a very large, strategically important region. Therefore, they moved cautiously to ensure an advantageous position after the anticipated collapse. These calculations balanced Britain and France against Russia, the third Great Power, whose proximity to Ottoman territory had long caused fears in London and Paris that the Russian Empire might reach the Mediterranean Sea.

The involvement of Egypt in 1825 was a turning point because Egyptian control of the Peloponnesus was unacceptable to the French and British. Thus motivated, the Great Powers, with Britain taking the lead, began to search for a diplomatic solution. In the summer of 1825, the British-sponsored Act of Submission set the conditions for a Greek state that would be an autonomous part of the Ottoman Empire but under the protection of Britain. Two years later, the Treaty of London stated that France and Britain would intervene militarily if the Porte refused to negotiate a satisfactory settlement after its military success in the second phase of the war. The combined British and French fleets eventually decided the issue by destroying the Turco-Egyptian fleet at the Battle of Navarino in October 1827. Navarino created the conditions for a new Greek state. The exact boundaries, nature, and disposition of that state remained to be determined, but nonetheless by the spring of 1828 a free Greece had been established.

The Presidency of Kapodistrias

The Assembly of Troezene, convened by the insurgents in May 1827, elected Ioannis Kapodistrias president of the fledgling state and he took up the post in May 1828. Kapodistrias had enjoyed a long and fruitful career in the foreign service of the Russian Empire, at one point holding the rank of privy councillor to Tsar Alexander I. Because he had not been associated with any Greek faction during the war for independence and because the Great Powers knew and trusted him, Kapodistrias seemed an ideal choice as president at this crucial juncture.

Kapodistrias faced enormous problems, however. The Ottoman Empire had not given up hopes of maintaining control of Greece, so hostilities continued in 1828. Within Greece, political factions continued to control what amounted to private armies. Much of Greece lay in ruins, and the new state had no money with which to continue the struggle. Finally, Kapodistrias responded to incessant opposition to his Westernizing initiatives by an enlightened despotism that violated the constitution under which he had been elected. His brief rule was ended by assassins in 1831. The fate of Greece was more than ever in the paternalistic care of Britain, France, and Russia.

Two pacts, the Treaty of Adrianople (September 1829) and the Treaty of Constantinople (July 1832), vouchsafed the existence of an independent Greek state by placing it under British, French, and Russian protection, defined its boundaries, established its system of government, and determined its first ruler—Otto, son of Ludwig I, king of Bavaria. In 1832, then, Greece came into existence. A pale realization of the lofty "New Byzantium" visualized by the eighteenth-century Greek intellectuals, it was a tiny, foreign-ruled, and utterly dependent entity. Nonetheless, for the first time in history the Greek nation existed as a unitary state.

The Rule of Otto

The reign of Otto included the installation of a wide variety of Western institutions, many of which were ill-suited to Greek society and political tradition. The factionalism of the revolutionary period continued and eroded the king's authority. Corruption flourished, and Otto finally was deposed by a combination of popular rebellion and coups.

Otto's Early Years

The second son of Ludwig, Otto of Wittgenstein was seventeen years old when he ascended the throne of the newly formed kingdom of Greece. His reign traditionally is divided into two segments, the first from 1832 until 1844 and the second from 1844 until Otto's abdication in 1862.

Formidable problems faced Otto and the three regents appointed in 1833 to assist him. The agricultural infrastructure on which the economy was based lay in ruins. At least twothirds of the olive trees, vineyards, and flour mills had been destroyed, and only about 10 percent of Greece's sheep and goat flocks remained. Many villages were devastated, as were several of the most important commercial centers. Destitute and displaced, the rural populace looked to their new king for relief. Several groups that had supported the war for independence now demanded compensation. The military leaders who had led and financed the war wanted land, power, and pay for their men. Shipowners demanded indemnity for their substantial losses in naval battles. The soldiers who had fought the war wanted regular pay, land, or both. The peasants wanted land. Satisfying all these claims was impossible.

Greece's persistent fiscal crises were exacerbated by the fact that the fertile agricultural areas of Thessaly and Macedonia, the major ports of Thessaloniki and Smyrna, and the island of Crete remained outside the kingdom (see fig. 6). In spite of the expertise and connections that the Greeks of the diaspora brought with them as they migrated to the new kingdom, manufacturing and trade remained underdeveloped. The only feasible internal source of revenue was a tax on agriculture, the growth of which was most fundamental to the country's prosperity. Thus, land and loans given to peasants to expand cultivation were soon reclaimed in the form of taxes. The government borrowed repeatedly from Greeks abroad, from foreign banks, and from other European states, incurring formidable debts and establishing a pattern that has endured throughout the modern epoch (see The Economic Development of Modern Greece, ch. 3).

In spite of such obstacles, Greece revived from the devastation of eleven years of war. Athens, the new capital, added a



Figure 6. The Expansion of Modern Greece, 1832–1947

royal palace and mansions to house the political elite who flocked there. Resettlement in the countryside allowed agricultural production to rebound. The merchant marine recovered from its wartime losses, Greek merchants once again handled much of the seagoing freight of the Mediterranean, and ports such as Siros, in the Cyclades, and Patras, on the northwest Peloponnesus, began to flourish once again.

Political stability proved elusive in the first phase of Otto's rule, however. In imposing Western models, Otto and his advisers showed little sensitivity to indigenous traditions of politics, law, and education. The political system established in 1834 preserved the social schisms that existed during the war and promoted new ones. The kingdom was divided administratively into ten prefectures, fifty-nine subprefectures, and 468 counties. The leaders at all three levels were appointed by the king. Only a small oligarchy, the *tzakia*, had a role in this process at the county level. Such absolute power alienated the Greeks who had fought the war in the name of republicanism. Armed bands were reorganized to further the political aims of their wartime leaders, and violent uprisings occurred annually between 1835 and 1842.

Otto's Roman Catholicism added further fuel to the political fire. In 1833 the patriarch of Constantinople established an autocephalous Orthodox Church of the Kingdom of Greece with Otto at its head. He, however, showed no inclination toward conversion. Tensions came to a head in 1843, when a bloodless military coup soon forced Otto to permit the writing of a new constitution.

After the First Constitution, 1844–62

The second period of Otto's rule began in March 1844, when in the aftermath of the military coup, Otto convened a national assembly to draft a constitution. When the assembly finished its work that spring, a new system of government was established. Otto would henceforth rule as a constitutional monarch. A bicameral legislature would be elected by all property-holding males over twenty-five. In theory Greece became one of the most democratic states in Europe. Otto, however, retained the power to appoint and dismiss government ministers, to dissolve parliament, to veto legislation, and issue executive decrees.

Instead of promoting political parties, parliamentary democracy spawned a new factionalism based on the patronage of prominent individuals. The politics of personality was exemplified by the career of Ioannis Kolettis, who was appointed prime minister under the new system in 1844. Kolettis managed parliament and achieved a virtual monopoly of administrative power by use of lavish bribes, intimidation, and a keen sensitivity to public opinion. Kolettis also originated the Megali Idea (Great Idea), the concept that Greeks must be reunited by annexing Ottoman territory adjacent to the republic. Otto's inability to fulfill the Megali Idea was a major cause of his downfall.

Irredentism was the single idea that united the disparate factions and regions of Greece following independence. The Megali Idea influenced all of Greek foreign policy through the nineteenth century. As early as the late 1830s, Greek insurgent movements were active in Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus, and by 1848 Greece and the Porte were on the brink of war over raids by Greek privateers into Ottoman territory.

The Crimean War appeared to offer an opportunity for Greece to gain major territorial concessions from the sultan. Expecting that Russia would defeat the Ottoman Empire in this war, Otto sent Greek troops to occupy Ottoman territory in adjacent Thessaly and Epirus under the pretext of protecting Balkan Christians. However, Britain and France intervened on the side of the Porte, and in 1854 British and French occupation of the port of Piraeus forced Otto to relinquish his "Christian cause"—a humiliation that drastically curtailed his power. Radical university students narrowly failed to assassinate Queen Amalia in 1861, and a military revolt in 1862 was only partially suppressed. Finally, in another bloodless coup later that year, Otto was forced to abdicate the throne.

The Age of Reform, 1864–1909

In 1864 a constituent assembly promulgated a new constitution that vested sovereignty in the Greek people and specified precisely the monarch's powers. A single-chamber parliament with full legislative powers would be elected by direct, secret ballot. Because the king retained substantial powers, however, the choice of a new monarch remained an extremely important issue.

The Constitution of 1864

Otto's successor had to be uniquely noncontroversial. Prince Albert, son of Queen Victoria of Britain, was selected by 95 percent of Greeks voting in a 1862 referendum, but France and Russia rejected this outcome because it would give Britain direct control of the Greek throne. The eventual choice was Prince William, second son of the future King Christian IX of Denmark and brother of the future queen consort Alexandra of Britain. The prince would reign as George I until his assassination in 1913.

Greece's constitutional reforms seemed to yield little political change. Powerful personalities maintained their fiefdoms through patronage networks, although issues such as industrialization and government planning opened a new split between the growing liberal urban middle class and conservatives of the old *tzakia* elite.

The most significant element of Greek political culture in the second half of the nineteenth century was the political clubs that proliferated. Such clubs of professional men and landowners fostered coherent political discourse and linked members of parliament with local power brokers. They also mobilized support for parliamentary candidates representing the political views of the clubs' members. Large landowners, for example, guaranteed the votes of their laborers on behalf of local patrons. Artisan associations and mercantile guilds such as the Athens-based Guild of Greengrocers, also provided vehicles for political acculturation and mobilized electoral support. This patchwork of clubs and guilds was the starting point of political factions and other fluid political groupings that lay at the base of Greek parliamentary democracy as it was practiced under the 1864 constitution.

In spite of the new constitution, the political system was deeply flawed. From 1865 to 1875, seven general elections were held, and eighteen different administrations held office. King George could and did create and dismiss governments if legislation or a budget failed to pass, so political leaders constantly juggled competing interests to keep fragile ruling coalitions together. Often the king asked leaders of minority parties to form governments while more significant legislative figures were overlooked, actions that were a recipe for political gridlock as well as a mockery of the democratic process.

The Trikoupis Reforms

The politician Kharilaos Trikoupis began to address the problem of gridlock in 1869. After Trikoupis wrote a newspaper article identifying the king's toleration of minority governments in 1874 (and after the writer's arrest for treason), the king agreed that a government could be formed only by the leader of the strongest party in parliament. If no party could obtain the pledged support of a plurality, then the king would dissolve parliament and call for a general election. The result of this reform was a relatively stable twenty-five-year period at the end of the century, in which only seven general elections were held.

Trikoupis and his arch-rival Theodoros Deliyannis were the dominant political figures of the last quarter of the nineteenth century—Trikoupis the Westernizer and modernizer, Deliyannis the traditionalist and strong advocate of irredentism. Trikoupis saw Greece as needing to develop economically, become more liberal socially, and develop its military strength in order to become a truly "modern" state. During his terms as prime minister in the 1880s (altogether he served seven terms, interspersed with the first three of Deliyannis's five terms), Trikoupis made major economic and social reforms that pushed Greece significantly to develop in these ways.

Trikoupis emphasized expansion of Greece's export sector and its chief support elements—the transportation network and agricultural cultivation. In the last decades of the 1800s, agricultural reforms, which were only moderately successful, aimed at increasing the purchasing power of the rural population as well as fostering large estates that could raise production of export commodities and improve Greece's chronic balance of payments deficit. However, land-allotment patterns failed to raise most peasants above the level of subsistence farming, and foreclosures of peasant properties created large estates whose single-crop contributions made the Greek agricultural export structure quite fragile.

Between 1875 and 1895, steamship tonnage under Greek ownership rose by a factor of about sixteen. Industrialization, especially textile production, also developed under the paternal eye of the Trikoupis government. Between 1875 and 1900, the steam horsepower of Greek plants increased by over 250 percent. In addition, by greatly expanding public education, Trikoupis fostered a new cultural climate that drew on Western trends in dress, architecture, art, and manners.

The only engine to drive such reform programs was extensive foreign loans. By 1887 some 40 percent of government expenditures went to servicing the national debt. Trikoupis levied taxes and import tariffs on numerous commodities, increased the land tax, and established government monopolies on salt and matches.

The sustained deficits incurred through the 1880s set up an economic collapse in the 1890s. When the price of currants, the chief agricultural export, collapsed in 1893, the national economy collapsed as well. By 1897 Greece was bankrupt, and its age of reform, which yielded many beneficial and permanent changes, had ended.

Attempts at Expansion

The irredentism of the Megali Idea, which had remained a strong force in Greek society since independence, gained new momentum from the liberation of territory surrounding Greece and from changes in Great Power policy in the second half of the nineteenth century. The results were conflict with the Ottoman Empire in Crete and with the Slavs in Macedonia, along with territorial gains in Thessaly and Arta.

In 1866 the first of three revolutions began on the strategically crucial island of Crete. Omission of Crete in the formation of the kingdom of Greece remained a sore point, and the island's status became more problematic as the fate of the Ottoman Empire assumed a greater role in Great Power relations. Although all the powers wished to prevent occupation of Crete by a rival, European solutions to Mediterranean crises repeatedly left Crete to the sultan, merely pressuring him to improve conditions for the Orthodox population of the island.

In the 1860s, however, the Great Powers agreed to the unification of Italy and the transfer by Britain of the Ionian Islands to Greece. As the Orthodox population and nationalist sentiments grew on Crete and King George openly supported the Cretan reunification factions, these changes also reinforced Greek advocacy of claims to Crete. The result was a guerrilla rebellion on Crete that received wide support from the Greek government and people.

Although the Cretan rebels found considerable public sympathy in the West, efforts by Russia and Serbia to profit from the Ottoman Empire's distraction in Crete brought diplomatic pressure from Britain and France. By 1869 Serbian and Russian support of the rebellion had softened, and the Ottoman fleet had used a blockade of Crete to its advantage. At the Paris peace talks of 1869, Greece agreed that Crete would remain part of the Ottoman Empire, with the stipulation of significant changes in the government of the islanders and in their legal status in the empire. However, Cretan unification remained a key issue for the next forty years.

Greece's first major territorial gains were the regions of Thessaly and Arta in the central mainland. In 1881 the Ottoman Empire ceded most of those regions to Greece as a byproduct of the complex negotiations of the Congress of Berlin to end the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. A combination of intense Greek lobbying and Turkish intransigence led to Great Power support for a bilateral treaty transferring the two regions from the Ottoman Empire to Greece.

A second territorial issue of bitter and long-standing importance was the disposition of Macedonia, a territory in which every nationalist group in the Balkans claimed a vital interest. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, efforts to impose either Greek or Slavic culture in Macedonia led to terrorist violence and atrocities and a perpetually volatile situation. Perceiving Macedonia as an essential element of the Megali Idea, Greece held vehemently to its claims, first against the Ottoman Empire and then against other Balkan nations. Elements of this policy remain in force today.

The Venizelos Era

Eleutherios Venizelos was the most influential Greek politician of the first half of the twentieth century, and he left a permanent mark on the country's social and economic life. A Cretan lawyer with a brilliant intellect, Venizelos worked tirelessly for reunification of Crete with Greece in the 1890s; then he burst into national politics when the leaders of the Goudi coup, conducted in 1909 by disaffected military officers, chose him to direct a new civilian government away from the military and financial disasters of the 1890s.

The Rise of the Liberal Party

The first years of the 1900s witnessed mass demonstrations against social conditions and a chaotic upheaval of new political factions, but no strong party or leader emerged. Venizelos became leader of the new Liberal Party, which drew support from nationalist professionals, workers, and merchants and tried to fill the needs of all those classes. In 1910 and in 1912, the Liberal Party won two national elections, making Venizelos prime minister and passing reform legislation at a frantic pace. New state bureaucracies were established, and the powers of the governmental branches were substantially reworked by constitutional amendment. Social laws established workers' rights and simplified taxes while Venizelos built military support by expanding and reequipping the army. The first years of Venizelos's power stabilized Greece's finances and stemmed the massive social unrest that had promised major upheaval.

The Balkan Wars, 1912–13

The Balkans soon were convulsed in a major regional war, from which Greece emerged victorious and with its territory substantially enlarged. At the heart of the Balkan Wars were three issues: the disposition of Macedonia, the problem of Crete, and liberation of the countries still under Ottoman control, especially Albania.

Some Macedonians wanted full unification with Greece, others wanted a separate Macedonian state, and still others wanted Macedonia to be included in a Serbian or Albanian or Bulgarian state. This issue was appallingly divisive, and the choice often was literally a matter of life or death. Guerrilla fighters and propagandists entered Macedonia from Greece and all the other countries of the region. Athens actively supported the irredentist movement in Macedonia with money, materials, and about 2,000 troops. Thessaloniki became more of a Greek city as non-Greek merchants suffered boycotts and left. Greece's lack of access to this key port heightened tension with the Slavic neighbors.

Under these circumstances, all the Great Powers became more involved in the Macedonian problem in the first decade of the twentieth century. Britain pressured Greece to curb guerrilla activities. When the Young Turks took over the government of the Ottoman Empire with a reformist agenda in 1908, a short period of cordial negotiations with the Greeks was chilled by reversion to nationalist, authoritarian rule in Constantinople. New Ottoman intransigence over Crete and Macedonia combined with Venizelos's demand for complete reunification to raise the prospect of war in 1910.

Nationalism in the Balkans was the final element of the war that erupted in 1912. Early that year, a mutual defense pact between Serbia and Bulgaria divided northern Macedonia between those two countries. In response Athens signed bilateral pacts with both neighbors. Essentially, the three Balkan powers thus agreed to cooperate militarily against the Porte, but they did not agree on the vital question of how to distribute territory surrendered by the Ottoman Empire.

The Balkan powers initiated the First Balkan War by marshaling over 1 million troops and then declaring war on the Turks in October 1912. Venizelos's military modernization paid rich dividends. Within a matter of weeks, the Greek army took Thessaloniki and besieged Ioannina to the west. The armies of all three allies fought, mainly to gain a favorable position in a postwar settlement. In the May 1913 Treaty of London, the Ottoman Empire ceded all its European possessions to the Balkan allies, with the exception of Thrace and Albania, the latter of which became independent.

Because the Treaty of London made no division of territory among the allies, and because Greece and Serbia had divided Macedonian territory between themselves in a bilateral agreement, Bulgaria attacked both, initiating the Second Balkan War. Greece and Serbia won victories that ensured major territorial gains at the Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913.

The addition of southern Epirus, Macedonia, Crete, and some of the Aegean Islands expanded Greece by 68 percent, including some of the richest agricultural land on the peninsula, and the population nearly doubled. The major Greek cities of Ioannina and Thessaloniki were reclaimed. Although more than 3 million Greeks remained in Ottoman territory, the Balkan Wars had brought the Megali Idea closer to realization than ever before. When King Constantine was crowned following the assassination of King George in Thessaloniki in March 1913, national morale had reached a high point.

World War I and the National Schism

The division of Europe into competing alliance groups, with the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) on one side and the Triple Alliance or the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Italy, and eventually the Ottoman Empire) on the other, had ramifications throughout the complex diplomatic and ethnic relationships of the Balkans. In Greece the war that arose between those alliances sharpened the outlines of two opposing styles of government and foreign policy. The resulting bitter schism remained in Greek politics and society for decades after the end of World War I.

Greece and the World War I Alliances

Amid the European alliances of 1914, Greece found itself in

a quandary. It had a number of reasons for opposing the Central Powers. First, the unredeemed Greeks of the East were cause for opposing any alliance that included the Porte. Second, Bulgaria, still a rival for territory in Macedonia, had aligned itself with the Central Powers. Third, treaty obligations bound Greece to Serbia, which was in a territorial dispute with the Austro-Hungarian Empire over Bosnia. Finally, the Entente powers had earned Greek loyalty by supporting Greek national aspirations since the struggle for independence. On the other hand, Queen Sofia of Greece was the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, and the German military establishment had considerable influence among Greek military leaders, many of whom had been trained in Germany. When World War I erupted in the summer of 1914, these interests came into direct conflict, and Greece was compelled to choose a side.

King Constantine, whose sympathies were clearly with the Central Powers, believed that Greece's interests could best be served by maintaining Greek neutrality. Prime Minister Venizelos, on the other hand, was staunchly pro-Entente. His position was reinforced in January 1915 when Britain promised to award Asia Minor (including all of modern Turkey) to Greece if Greece would lend military support to the Serbs and to the proposed British and French invasion of the Turkish mainland at Gallipoli (Geliboli). And Venizelos, believing that the Entente would win the war and make good on its offer, resigned as prime minister when Constantine and the Greek general staff opposed alliance with the Entente. The dispute over national policy finally brought about a constitutional crisis that came to be known as the Ethnikos Dikhasmos, or the National Schism.

The Crisis of Wartime Leadership

The parliamentary election of June 1915 gave Venizelos and the Liberals a majority of seats, but the king refused to recognize the result and withheld approval of the new government until August. In this critical period, Serbia's military position deteriorated, and Bulgaria used the opportunity to declare war on Serbia and reverse the Bulgarian losses of the Second Balkan War. In this process, Sofia also claimed Macedonia and Thessaloniki. Venizelos demanded that the army be mobilized according to the terms of the mutual defense treaty with Serbia. Constantine reluctantly agreed, but only if Greece itself were attacked. Then, without informing the king, Venizelos allowed the French and British to establish a northern front for their Gallipoli attack by landing troops in Macedonia. Before Constantine could react, Venizelos escalated tensions further by orchestrating a parliamentary declaration of war on Bulgaria, which also meant a declaration of war against the Central Powers. A war motion won by a thirty-seven-vote margin, heightening the conflict between Constantine and Venizelos.

Technically, the Greek constitution gave the monarch the right to dismiss a government unilaterally, but the general understanding was that the constitutional provision would only be used when the popular will of the nation was in doubt. Nevertheless, Constantine forced Venizelos to resign once again, dissolved the new parliament, and announced a new election for December 1915.

The Schism Worsens

Together with the vast majority of the electorate, the Liberals boycotted the vote, depriving the newly elected government of all valid popular support. Through the rest of 1915 and 1916, relations between the Liberal and monarchist factions continued to deteriorate as the two sides adopted more rigid and radical positions. Popular opinion vacillated. For example, when French and British troops landed in Macedonia in December 1915 despite the protests of the king, most Greeks supported Constantine's position that the maneuver by the Entente Western Allies violated Greek sovereignty. But when monarchist military leaders allowed eastern Macedonia to fall to the Central Powers in May 1916, public opinion was outraged. Greek national opinion was becoming increasingly unclear.

By mid-1916 Greece stood on the brink of civil war. In Thessaloniki a clandestine pro-Venizelos military organization, the Ethniki Amina (National Defense), launched a coup against the government, with support from the British and French. In October Venizelos returned from Crete to lead the provisional government in Thessaloniki and form a new army to support the Entente. By the end of 1916, the British and French had recognized the provisional government and had blockaded most of Greece to force concessions from Constantine, who feared that Venizelos would topple him. For 106 days, no goods were imported or exported at central and southern Greek ports. Near-famine conditions developed in some areas. Under the leadership of Ioannis Metaxas, former aide-de-camp of Constantine and future dictator of Greece, a reactionary paramilitary unit, the League of Reservists, was founded. The league undertook a systematic campaign of terror and violence against Venizelists in Athens and against anyone who did not support the monarchy. Once a pattern of violent, sectarian reprisals had begun, it would prove very hard to stop.

Greece in World War I

The Allied blockade eventually rendered the king's position untenable. In June 1917, when the British and French threatened to bombard Athens if Constantine remained, the king passed his crown to his second son Alexander and left Greece, although he did not formally abdicate. Venizelos was now free to throw full Greek support behind the Allied cause.

After Greece declared war on the Central Powers in July 1917, ten divisions of the Greek army fought with great valor along the Macedonian front. In 1918 they routed German and Bulgarian positions and pushed the front line northward. Germany and its allies soon capitulated, and Greek troops were among those who marched triumphantly into Constantinople. At the cost of splitting the nation, Venizelos had brought Greece into the war on the victorious side. To justify the cost of this result and heal the wounds caused by the National Schism, he returned to the Megali Idea.

The Catastrophe in Asia Minor

Venizelos went to the Paris peace talks armed with the assurances he had received from the Allies during the war and focused exclusively on territorial aggrandizement for Greece. The peace that emerged seemed to promise full realization of the Megali Idea. In the event, shifts in domestic and international politics led to a disastrous conflict with the successors of the Ottoman Empire.

Venizelos showed all of his considerable diplomatic skills at the peace talks. He wooed the United States president, Woodrow Wilson, and Britain's Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Venizelos quickly offered the services of the Greek military as policing agents and as peacekeepers in occupied territory. Foreign leaders were indebted to the wily Venizelos for this assistance, but the offer fostered domestic discontent. The Greek armed forces had been mobilized almost continuously since 1912, and the nation was becoming war weary. Also, Venizelos neglected urgent domestic issues as he put all of his energies into winning the peace talks. He would eventually pay for this neglect.

After two years of intense negotiations, Greece stood on the verge of fulfilling the Megali Idea. The 1919 Treaty of Neuilly had awarded Bulgarian territory in western Thrace and Macedonia to Greece. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed with Turkey on August 10, 1920, gave Greece the Aegean Islands, hence command of the Dardanelles, and the eastern half of Thrace except for Constantinople. The Treaty of Sèvres also established a new territory around the city of Smyrna (called Izmir by the Turks) on the west coast of Asia Minor-a region long coveted by Greek nationalists. In accordance with the principle of national self-determination, all Greeks in Asia Minor were encouraged to move there. The Smyrna protectorate was to be administered by Greece but remain under the aegis of Turkey. After five years, a plebiscite would determine which country would have sovereignty. The outcome of such a vote had already been decided in 1919 by the stationing of Greek troops at Smyrna to solidify Greek control.

When Venizelos announced in triumph that Greece now occupied two continents and touched on five seas, the irredentist dream seemed to be coming true. The dream soon turned into a nightmare, however. As he prepared to return to Greece from the talks in France, Venizelos was shot by monarchist assassins. He survived, but he was already out of touch with events in Greece, and his extended convalescence isolated him even more from the domestic scene. Two months after the attack on Venizelos, King Alexander died, leaving the exiled Constantine as the only claimant to the throne. A war-weary electorate then expressed its dissatisfaction with the heavyhanded Liberal government by resoundingly vanquishing the Liberals in the elections of November 1920.

Repudiated by the nation at the moment of his greatest triumph, Venizelos went into self-imposed exile. A broad anti-Venizelist coalition took power and immediately scheduled a plebiscite on the restoration of Constantine. Following a landslide approval that was clearly rigged, Constantine returned to the throne amid popular rejoicing in December 1920.

Royalist Foreign Policy Revisions

These developments brought several important consequences. First, royalists avenged the purges inflicted on them in 1917 by mounting counterpurges against Venizelists in the bureaucracy and the military, perpetuating the wounds of the National Schism. Second, the conservatives attempted to outdo the fervent nationalism of the Venizelists by adopting an even more aggressive position toward Turkey. Third, because many of the commitments made to Greece were personal ones between Allied leaders such as Lloyd George and Wilson—who themselves would soon fall from power—and Venizelos, the removal of the Cretan statesman from power considerably weakened those agreements. The result was that Allied support for Greek expansion waned.

The Asia Minor Offensive

In the winter of 1921, the Greek government decided on a military confrontation with the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk), which was growing in strength and threatening the Smyrna Protectorate. In March Athens launched a major offensive. The Greek army pushed eastward into Asia Minor along a broad front. At one point, the Greek line extended across much of Anatolia. Through 1921, the Greek army met only success, but Kemal retreated skillfully to avoid major defeat. Constantine himself visited the front line, and his younger brother George remained there as a member of the high command. But Greece was now increasingly isolated from its wartime allies. Britain and the United States urged caution and offered to mediate a solution. France and Italy openly supplied arms to the Turks. When Britain and the United States withdrew loans to protest hostilities, Greece's cash resources, and soon ammunition and supplies, were seriously depleted. Internally, the Greek army was fraught with divisions between Venizelists and royalists.

The Retreat from Smyrna

The overextension of the Greek lines proved disastrous. Kemal lured the Greek army ever deeper into the rugged heartland of Anatolia. When he judged that the Greek position was untenable, Turkish forces shattered the Greek line with a major counteroffensive. Kemal then isolated and destroyed the segments of the Greek army, chasing the remnants back to Smyrna. While soldiers, sailors, and journalists from around the world watched from ships anchored in the bay, the Turkish forces burned and sacked the great city of Smyrna, killing about 30,000 Greeks. The Megali Idea went up in smoke on the shores of Asia Minor.

The Interwar Struggles, 1922-36

The disastrous military defeat at the hands of the Turks ensured that the National Schism would define Greek politics and keep society divided through the next two decades. In that time, political stability was rare, except for the successful return of Venizelos between 1928 and 1932. By 1931, however, world economic crisis brought a new set of internal conflicts.

The Treaty of Lausanne, 1923

The Greco-Turkish War had serious and lasting consequences. Two problems immediately faced Greece. The first was the establishment of a legitimate government, and the second was the need to cope with the flood of Greek refugees from the territory that had been lost.

The first problem was addressed quickly when a small, dedicated band of military officers formed a Revolutionary Committee in 1922. Under pro-Venizelos colonels Nikolaos Plastiras and Stilianos Gonatas, the committee landed 12,000 troops at Lavrion, south of Athens, and staged a coup. They demanded and received the resignation of the government and the abdication of King Constantine. George, Constantine's elder son (who had refused the crown when Constantine left in 1917), was crowned as king, and the coup leaders began purging royalists from the bureaucracy and the military.

The next step was to assign blame for the catastrophe. At a show trial, Dimitrios Gounaris, who had been prime minister at the beginning of the war, and seven of his government officials became national scapegoats when they were charged with high treason; six were executed, although their worst crime was incompetence. The executions increased the ferocity of the rift between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, and the military became an independent political force.

The Plastiras government turned to Venizelos to negotiate an acceptable peace with Turkey. In the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, Greece relinquished all territory in Asia Minor, eastern Thrace, and two small islands off Turkey's northwest coast. At Lausanne Greece and Turkey agreed to the largest single compulsory exchange of populations known to that time. All Muslims living in Greece, except for the Slavic Pomaks in Thrace and the Dodecanese, and Turkish Muslims in Thrace, were to be evacuated to Turkey; they numbered nearly 400,000. In return approximately 1,300,000 Greeks were expelled to Greece. The determining factor for this shift was religion, not language or culture. Also included in the treaty was protection of Orthodox Greeks and Muslims as religious minorities in Turkey and Greece, respectively.

The Treaty of Lausanne essentially established the boundaries of today's Greece, turning the country into an ethnically homogeneous state by removing almost all of the major minority groups. It also ended once and for all the possibility of including more ethnic Greeks in the nation, the Megali Idea. And, by instantly increasing Greece's population by about 20 percent, Lausanne posed the huge problem of dealing with over 1 million destitute refugees.

The Refugee Crisis

Even before 1923, a torrent of refugees was making its way to Greece. After the ethnic exchange, Greece's poor fiscal situation was strained past its limits by the refugees' need for food and shelter. Tent cities sprang up around Athens and Thessaloniki. Most refugees had fled with only the few items that they could carry; many had nothing at all. A disproportionate number of them were women, children, and elderly men because the Turks had detained young Greek men in labor camps. Massive foreign aid organized by the League of Nations was a major contribution toward alleviating the most immediate needs of the refugees. Eventually, refugee neighborhoods developed around Athens and its port city of Piraeus. Many of these enclaves still retain a distinctive identity today. Other refugees were settled in areas of Macedonia and Crete from which Muslims had departed. The hellenization of these regions included the introduction by new Greek settlers of tobacco farming, which became an important factor in Macedonia's agricultural economy. Many of the newcomers who settled in the cities were professionals or entrepreneurs, who helped to invigorate the industrial sector of Greece. The manufacture of cigarettes, cigars, carpets, and textiles grew dramatically, primarily because of the Asia Minor Greeks. Nevertheless, for many years the general economic condition of the refugee population was grim, and many suffered from discrimination and cultural isolation after leaving Asia Minor.

Political Turmoil in the 1920s

During most of the 1920s, Greece was racked by political turmoil. Only under duress did the military release its grip on the political power it gained in 1922, and the National Schism was reflected in the two factions of the military—so coups and attempted coups occurred quite regularly between 1923 and 1936 (except for the period 1928–32). When the Plastiras government gave way to a democratically elected regime led by Venizelos in 1924, stability seemed within reach. But after assessing the serious splits that had now appeared in his own ranks, most notably over the issue of maintaining or abolishing the monarchy, Venizelos again withdrew into exile. At that point, in March 1924, the monarchy was rejected overwhelmingly in a plebiscite, and Greece was declared a republic although a republican constitution did not emerge until 1927.

The change of government form could not stem the political unrest, however. Between 1924 and 1928, ten prime ministers held office, two presidents were deposed and one resigned, and eleven military coups occurred. This was one of Greece's darkest periods, culminating in 1926 in the ouster of the military dictatorship of General Theodoros Pangalos and the installation of an "ecumenical cabinet" that dealt with the hopeless deadlock of Venizelist and anti-Venizelist factions by representing all political parties in the executive branch. This unique arrangement lasted until 1928; it produced the republican constitution of 1927, which vested many of the monarch's former powers in a presidency and added a second legislative chamber.

The Second Venizelos Golden Age

In 1928 Venizelos emerged from exile once more to lead his party to win 71 percent of the seats contested in the parliamentary elections. As before, his presence galvanized political support and opposition—but this time Venizelos fashioned an effective parliamentary coalition based on the old Liberal Party and refugees, and he presided over four years of economic growth and political stability.

In spite of a strong parliamentary base, Venizelos had to negotiate treacherous waters as prime minister in order to control the hard-line antiroyalists, most of whom were conservative in other respects, and placate old-style Liberals, leftists, and refugees, an important support group that increasingly was leaning to the left. The conservative Populist Party provided the main opposition, and the central issue separating the two major parties in this period was the constitutional question.

Venizelos was able to implement a number of changes, most of them funded by external loans. He introduced numerous reforms aimed at improving Greek agriculture: land reclamation schemes, agricultural credit programs, and price supports for agricultural produce. The highway and railroad infrastructures were improved and expanded. Protective tariffs were raised to make indigenous products more competitive in the domestic market. Public housing projects were erected and made available to poor Greeks, especially refugees. A British loan of more than $\pounds1,000,000$ was contracted for the building of public schools (see From 1909 to World War II, ch. 3).

Venizelos also scored some notable successes in foreign policy. The most important of these was his rapprochement with Atatürk, culminating in the October 1930 Treaty of Ankara, by which Greece and Turkey officially recognized their respective territorial boundaries and accepted naval equality in the eastern Mediterranean. Venizelos also normalized relations with neighbors Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

The Crises of the 1930s

The world financial crisis of 1930 and 1931 initiated a period of political chaos in Greece. The national economy was now based on export of luxury agricultural goods such as tobacco, olive oil, and raisins—commodities whose international demand fell sharply during the hard times of the Great Depression. Payments from Greeks overseas dropped at the same time. Having lost most of its foreign-exchange sources, Greece experienced difficulties in servicing its large foreign debt in the early 1930s.

Because Venizelos did not address the economic dilemma effectively, his fragile political coalition began to unravel. Unable to maintain control, Venizelos relinquished power in mid-1932. Elections that fall divided power almost equally between the Liberals and the Populists, and the latter failed to form a viable government. Chaos and military purges resulted from this deadlock, and Plastiras attempted a military coup in 1933. After the failed coup and an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Venizelos, the bitterness of the old disputes rose to the surface of public life. In 1935 the failure of another coup, in which Venizelos was directly implicated, completely destroyed his public image. Discredited, Venizelos retired to Paris, where he died in 1936.

The Populists clearly won the parliamentary elections of 1935, aided by the Venizelists' decision to boycott the vote in protest at the imposition of martial law. The unstable Populist government soon toppled, however, and in October a rump parliament declared the restoration of the monarchy and rigged a plebiscite in which 97 percent of votes called for the return of King George to the throne. When he returned to Greece in November 1935, George attempted to repair the National Schism by pardoning all participants in the Venizelist coup of 1935.

The Metaxas Era

The National Schism continued to divide Greek politics and society in the mid-1930s. King George chose General Metaxas to head a new government in 1936, and Metaxas's dictatorial regime finally restored public order. The cost was an extended period of one-party government and repression of human rights that set the stage for more bitter political divisiveness after World War II.

Metaxas Takes Power

The elections of January 1936, which the Populists hoped would finally legitimize their position, instead brought another deadlock between the Populists and the Liberals. This time, however, the political balance was even more precarious because the fifteen votes won by the Communist Party (Kommunistikon Komma Ellados—KKE) gave it the power to swing ballots in parliament.

In this atmosphere, General Ioannis Metaxas emerged as a political force. Metaxas, always a foe of Venizelos and a participant in several coup attempts, had been a minor character on the extreme right of the Greek political spectrum in the 1920s. During that time, he had cultivated a close relationship with the royal house. After his return to the throne in 1935, King George searched frantically for an anticommunist political leader strong enough to bind together a working coalition and control the leftist factions but not strong enough to lead a coup against the throne. The search led the king first to appoint Metaxas minister of war and then prime minister, whereupon Metaxas immediately pressured parliament into a five-month adjournment.

In May 1936, labor unrest and massive strikes cast doubt on the government's ability to maintain public order. Metaxas used the opportunity to declare a state of emergency, dissolve parliament for an indefinite period, and suspend human rights articles of the constitution. These actions, conducted in August, made Metaxas dictator of Greece. He modeled his regime on the fascist governments of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Political parties and trade unions were abolished, strikes became illegal, political opponents were arrested, and press censorship prevailed. Metaxas sought to reduce labor unrest by raising wages and improving working conditions in industry and by raising agricultural prices and absorbing farmers' debts. By 1938 per capita income had increased drastically, and unemployment was dropping. Metaxas dismantled the old patronage system based on royalist and Venizelist party loyalties. Ironically, by sweeping away political parties the rightist dictatorship created a political vacuum in which the constituency of the Greek leftists, especially the communists, grew larger.

Metaxas's "Third Hellenic Civilization" (the first being ancient Greece and the second the Byzantine Empire) lacked the broad base of popular support enjoyed by the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini—Greek fascism was not a mass movement, nor was it based on a coherent ideology or racist dogma. In general, the Greek public neither supported nor actively resisted the authoritarian paternalism of Metaxas.

The Metaxas Social and Foreign Policies

In extolling the virtues of self-sacrifice for the public good, Metaxas sought to reshape the national character. He established a variety of national organizations such as the National Youth Movement to foster those virtues in Greek citizens. For the working classes, he instituted a coherent program of public works and drainage projects, set wage rates, regulated hours of labor, guaranteed the five-day work week, and passed other measures aimed at making the workplace safer. The bureaucracy and the military were revamped and streamlined.

The price of such a program was deprivation of freedom. The secret police became all powerful; communists and other leftists were subjected to especially brutal repression. Over 30,000 persons were arrested and incarcerated or exiled on political grounds, and torture was routinely used to extract confessions or accusations that others had acted against the state. A new form of the National Schism, now left versus right, was being created as the old one lapsed.

The main dilemma for the Metaxas regime was foreign policy. Metaxas saw his fellow dictators in Germany and Italy as natural allies, and Germany made major advances into Greek markets in the late 1930s. But Greece's national security remained closely tied to Britain, whose fleet remained a dominant force in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, as Italian policy developed in the 1930s, Mussolini's plans for a "new Rome" obviously conflicted with Greek ambitions to control the Aegean and the Dodecanese Islands and exert influence in Albania. Italian expansionism in the region placed Metaxas and Mussolini on a collision course. As war approached in Europe, Metaxas found it increasingly hard to walk the fine line between the Allies and the Axis powers.

Mussolini's persistent provocations settled the issue. In October 1940, Italy demanded that Greece allow Italian occupation of strategic locations on Greek soil. Although Metaxas's resounding refusal plunged Greece into war, it also significantly improved Greece's national self-esteem.

The Terrible Decade: Occupation and Civil War, 1940–50

The decade of the 1940s was the most devastating and deadly in Greek history. In that period, the horrors of foreign military occupation were followed by the ravages of the Civil War. The events of this decade left wounds that remain unhealed more than fifty years later.

The German Invasion of 1941

Initially the war against Germany and Italy went very well for Greece. The nation rallied behind Metaxas, and men of all political persuasions joined the military. Under the leadership of General Georgios Tsolakoglou, the Greek army in Epirus drove the Italians out of Greece and through most of Albania by early December. For many Greeks, this campaign was an opportunity to liberate their countrymen across the Albanian border in "Northern Epirus." The campaign stalled in cold weather, then it lost its leader, Metaxas, who died in January 1941. The British, who at this time had no other active ally in the region, provided air and ground support. But poor coordination between the allied forces made Greece vulnerable to a massive German attack in the spring of 1941, which was intended to secure the Nazi southern flank in preparation for the invasion of Russia. Under the German blitzkrieg, the Greek and British forces quickly fell. Most of the British force escaped, but Tsolakoglou, trapped between the Italian and the German armies, was forced to capitulate. Athens fell shortly afterward as the second element of the German invasion force rushed southward. King George II, his government, and the remnants of the Greek army fled to Crete. Crete fell the next month, however, and George established a government-in-exile in Egypt.

By June 1941, Greece had been divided among Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy. The Germans controlled all the most critical points: Athens, Thessaloniki, Crete, the Thracian border zone with Turkey, and a number of the Aegean Islands. The Bulgarians were given Thrace and most of Macedonia, which they proceeded to rule with an iron hand. The Italians occupied the rest of Greece. From the outset, however, the Germans effectively controlled the country, ruling harshly through the collaborationist governments of Tsolakoglou and later Ioannis Rallis. The German plundering of the nation's resources for the war effort combined with a British naval blockade to cause food shortages, massive inflation, and finally a devastating famine that killed as many as 100,000 people in the winter of 1941– 42.

Resistance, Exiles, and Collaborators

The brutality of foreign occupation did not strangle the will to resist. Intermittent, spontaneous acts of resistance during the summer of 1941 led eventually to the formation of a more united effort. In September, the National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon—EAM) was formed to coordinate resistance activities. A secondary aim of the organization was to ensure free choice of the form of government that would follow liberation.

In the five-part coalition of EAM, the old constitutional disputes between monarchists and republicans resurfaced, providing the KKE an opportunity to dominate the organization from its inception. The KKE also took a dominant position in subordinate organizations, such as the combat arm of EAM, the National People's Liberation Army (Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos—ELAS). The KKE's position was possible for a number of reasons. First, in the 1930s the Metaxas regime had driven the communists into precisely the type of underground resistance activity needed to fight the Nazis. Unlike traditional Greek parties (including its allies in the EAM), the KKE was a close-knit, well-organized group with a definite ideology. Also, the communists projected a vision of a better future at a time of great suffering, appealing especially to people who had lacked privileges in Greece's traditional oligarchical society. Finally, the firm stand of the Greek communists on native soil compared well with the actions of the old politicians and the king who had fled to the safety of London and Cairo.

Thus, although the vast majority of EAM and ELAS members were not communists, most were ready to follow the communist leadership. Other resistance groups, such as the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Stratos—EDES), existed, but EAM and ELAS played the largest role in resistance activities. Monarchist elements of society generally withheld support from resistance groups.

Little coordination occurred between the government-inexile and resistance forces in occupied Greece. Some exile groups even counseled against resistance movements because of the brutal reprisals threatened by the occupiers against the civilian population. In fact, in 1942 the escalation of sabotage, strikes, and mutinies by resistance groups did increase the severity of reprisals. The Germans decreed that fifty Greeks be killed for every German soldier lost, and entire villages were destroyed. The puppet occupation government formed security battalions manned by collaborators, many of whom were die-hard monarchists and thus opposed to the resistance movements because of old constitutional issues. Removed from such terrors at home, the government-in-exile rapidly lost legitimacy.

One of the war's many tragedies was the destruction of the Greek Jewish population. Before the war, Athens, Ioannina, and Thessaloniki had vibrant and sizeable Jewish communities. From Thessaloniki alone, 47,000 Jews were sent to Auschwitz, and by the end of the war Greece had lost 87 percent of its Jewish population.

Under the leadership of Athanasios Klaras, who took the nom de guerre Ares Veloukhiotis, ELAS carried out a number of successful sabotage missions beginning in mid-1942. The British special operations forces provided arms and experts, who together with fighters from ELAS and EDES struck a major blow against Germany by destroying the railroad line between Thessaloniki and Athens where it spanned the Gorgopotamos Gorge in central Greece. This action severed a vital supply line from Germany to Nazi forces in North Africa. But Britain failed to achieve long-term coordination of Greek resistance activities with conventional operations and other resistance groups in the eastern Mediterranean because of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's steadfast support for the Greek monarchy. By the end of 1942, Greek resistance activity was distracted by internal conflict over the eventual postwar direction of national government. ELAS began a second campaign, this one aimed at ensuring communist domination of resistance activity.

Resistance and Allied Strategy

In the summer of 1943, the British adopted a new strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. To distract Hitler from the main theater of European invasion planned to cross the English Channel in 1944, the British enlisted the cooperation of ELAS in simulating preparations for a major invasion in the Mediterranean. The strategy had credibility because of Britain's attempted invasion of the Ottoman Empire at Gallipoli in World War I. Although all resistance movements were to participate in the plan, ELAS was especially crucial because it controlled the largest army and occupied the most territory. Accordingly, in July 1943 Britain agreed to give ELAS additional support if ELAS would end its campaign against rival resistance groups.

However, in August a disastrous series of meetings in Cairo among guerrilla leaders, the king, and the government-in-exile removed all prospects of cooperation. The resistance leaders demanded guarantees that a plebiscite on the monarchy be held before the king returned to Greece, and that the postwar government include ELAS members heading the ministries of interior, justice, and war. Britain, whose main goal was ensuring continued stability and British influence in the postwar eastern Mediterranean, continued its pattern of intervention in Greek politics by supporting George's refusal of both demands. From that point to the end of the war, the government-in-exile and the EAM resistance were opponents rather than allies. The immediate result of the Cairo meetings was the onset of civil war between ELAS and EDES in October. Forced to choose, the British stepped up arm shipments to EDES while cutting off the supply to ELAS. This maneuver proved ineffective because the surrender of the Italian forces in September had provided ELAS with enough arms and munitions to be independent of outside supply. Having stabilized its position militarily, EAM declared the formation of a Political Committee of National Liberation (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftheroseos—PEEA) with its capital in the heart of liberated Greece.

The British, alarmed at the prospect of a communist takeover after the war, took steps to resist validation of the PEEA. In October 1944, Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin agreed (without the knowledge of any Greek faction) that postwar Greece would be in the British sphere of influence and that the Soviet Union would not interfere. In return, Churchill conceded Soviet control of postwar Romania.

EAM and Greek Society

Many Greeks rallied to the PEEA as a new alternative to the government-in-exile. For many people in the mountainous liberated areas of Greece, EAM/ELAS rule had established order, justice, and a tranquil communal life that prewar governments had failed to provide. The resistance movement offered women, in particular, new personal empowerment in their participation as warriors and workers. Peasants and working-class men also found unacceptable the prospect of going back to the old ways.

Another group also rallied to the call of the PEEA. The Greek military units that had escaped the Germans were assembled in the Middle East under the name Middle East Armed Forces (MEAF). Most soldiers and sailors, unlike their officers, were EAM sympathizers, and mutinies and strikes occurred in the MEAF between 1942 and 1944 as news of the communist resistance was received. In the spring of 1944, the formation of the PEEA stimulated a "grand revolt" by republican and communist enlisted personnel seeking recognition of a PEEA-sponsored government of national unity.

Liberation and Its Consequences

The grand revolt led to a change in the leadership of the Greek government-in-exile. Georgios Papandreou, who had

strong republican and anticommunist credentials, was appointed prime minister of a government of national unity organized in Lebanon. The purpose of the appointment was to attract noncommunist antimonarchists away from EAM to a staunchly anticommunist, pro-British government. In August 1944, after initially rejecting the minor posts allotted to it in the Papandreou government, EAM bowed to Soviet pressure and accepted the terms of the Lebanon agreement. The Germans began to withdraw from Greece in October. Although ELAS's control of the Greek countryside would have made a grab for power easy, in this period resistance forces confined their activities to harassing the German withdrawal.

Papandreou and the national government entered Athens on October 18. The euphoria of liberation swept all before it, and for days the streets were filled with rejoicing citizens. Beyond their joy, however, fear and mistrust abounded, and many key issues remained unresolved. As before the war, the constitutional schism still divided Greeks.

The Lebanon agreement called for the 60,000 armed men and women of ELAS, with the exception of one elite unit, to lay down their arms in December, with the aim of creating a new national force based on the MEAF. In late November, however, Papandreou demanded total demobilization of ELAS, a step the resistance leadership would not take. The leftist factions were already quite suspicious of the failure of Papandreou and the British to actively pursue and punish Greek collaborators, many of whom the Nazis had recruited by citing the threat of a communist takeover. By December, amid rising tension and suspicion on both sides, EAM called a mass rally and a general strike to protest the government's high-handedness. When police forces opened fire on demonstrators in Athens, a thirtythree-day street battle erupted between police and British troops on one side and ELAS fighters on the other. Although EAM was not prepared to seize power and fighting did not spread outside Athens, the potential for wider hostilities was clear. The Battle of Athens ruined some parts of the city and left as many as 11,000 dead.

When Churchill visited Greece to assess the situation, he became convinced that the constitutional issue had to be resolved as expeditiously as possible. Under strong British pressure to improve his image with the Greek people, King George agreed to the appointment of the widely respected Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens as his regent in Greece. In a concession to the opposition, Papandreou was replaced as prime minister by the old Liberal, General Plastiras.

In February 1945, a semblance of peace was restored with the Varkiza Agreement, under which most ELAS troops turned over their weapons in exchange for broad political amnesty, a guarantee of free speech, the lifting of martial law, amnesty for all "political crimes," and the calling of a plebiscite on the constitutional question. The Varkiza Agreement initiated what became known on the political left as the White Terror. Rather than prosecuting collaborators, the Ministry of Justice and the security apparatus, together with vigilante bands of anticommunists, ignored the political amnesty for the next two years, continuing the struggle of the collaborationist security service against resistance figures with known leftist connections. But now the latter had little public support, as most of Greek society went on an anticommunist crusade against which the KKE, forsaken by Stalin, could do little. Wartime heroes were executed for killing collaborators, and judges and tax collectors of the PEEA went to jail for unauthorized representation of the Greek government. Right-wing death squads and paramilitary groups embarked on a campaign of terror and assassination against leftists. Both communist and noncommunist EAM/ ELAS members went underground for their own safety. A series of weak governments proved incapable of stemming the escalating sectarian violence.

The Resumption of Elections

Themistoklis Sophoulis, another of the Liberal old guard, formed a government at the end of 1945; then he announced that in March 1946 a national election would precede by two years the promised plebiscite on the monarchy. This decision inverted the order of the two national ballots agreed upon in the Varkiza Agreement. The leftist parties, claiming that fair and impartial elections were impossible in the prevailing climate of violence and repression, called a boycott of the election. When war-weary Greeks went to the polls, their choice was limited by the decay of traditional parties under Metaxas. The election, which was marred by low turnout and considerable fraud, gave power to the People's Party, a loose coalition of the old Populist Party with Metaxasists, monarchists, and anticommunists. The new leader of the government was Konstantinos Tsaldaris, a nephew of the prewar Populist leader.

The Tsaldaris regime renewed the persecution of the left, removing civil servants and university professors from their posts because of their politics and accelerating the manhunts of right-wing bands. In 1946 over 30,000 men and women were interned in concentration camps or exiled. The country drifted ever closer to open civil conflict. Far ahead of schedule, Tsaldaris demanded a plebiscite on the monarchy. Rather than waiting until 1948, as had been announced by Sophoulis, he called for the referendum in September 1946. A highly suspect vote, which included coercion if not outright rigging, restored the monarchy by 68 percent to 32 percent. For many Greeks, the restoration represented a betrayal of everything they had fought for. Although there was widespread opposition to the idea of a communist government, there also was deep antipathy to the monarchy in general and especially to King George, who had been tainted by his closeness to Metaxas. On the verge of civil strife, the KKE resumed recruiting and began reassembling the nucleus of ELAS warriors who had fled into the mountains.

Civil War

In December 1946, Markos Vafiadis announced the formation of a communist Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), the successor of the ELAS. The DAG never exceeded 28,000 fighters, compared with about 265,000 troops in the national army and national police force at the end of the war. The Civil War commenced in earnest during the winter of 1946–47. Vafiadis adopted a strategy of guerrilla warfare, utilizing hit-and-run tactics to harass the national army and its allied groups. DAG forces scored some notable successes, but they were unable to capture any major towns. Like almost all internecine conflicts, the Civil War was marked by brutality on both sides. Villages were destroyed and civilians killed. The atrocities of the war left lasting scars on the nation's consciousness.

By the spring of 1947, Britain no longer was able to meet Greece's escalating demands for money and supplies, so the role of external patron was assumed by the United States. With the Greek case specifically in mind, Harry S. Truman set out in March 1947 a policy of global containment of communist expansion that came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman pledged United States support to all free peoples under the threat of communist takeover. Under that policy, the United States made US\$400 million in aid and military assistance available to Greece. United States advisers and military personnel under General James van Fleet came to Greece to train and supply the national army and the security forces.

Although the disproportionate size of the forces had made the outcome of the Civil War inevitable, the DAG's mistakes hastened its fall. After Vafiades was ousted by KKE chief Nikos Zahariadis in mid-1947, the DAG made a disastrous shift from guerrilla tactics to conventional, set-piece battles. Outgunned and outmanned, the DAG was pushed northward into the mountains.

In mid-1949, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito inflicted another costly blow by closing the supply routes through Yugoslavia as part of his policy to conciliate the West. As the situation deteriorated, forced conscription of men and women and compulsory evacuation of children eroded the DAG's popular base of support. The Civil War ended when the last DAG mountain stronghold fell at the end of August. Thus, in addition to the more than 500,000 killed in World War II, during the Civil War 80,000 more Greeks lost their lives, 700,000 more became refugees, and the national economy was left in ruins.

Reconstruction and Retribution, 1950-67

After World War II and the Civil War, Greece was in a political and economic shambles. With massive United States aid, however, new growth began almost immediately. Then, under Alexandros Papagos and Konstantinos Karamanlis, leaders of new conservative coalition parties, political conditions stabilized and the economy experienced an extended growth period (see Postwar Recovery, ch. 3).

The Marshall Plan in Greece

In 1949 the Greek Ministry of Welfare listed 1,617,132 persons as indigent; destitute, despondent, and directionless, they looked to Athens for assistance. Another 80,000 to 100,000 had fled their homeland voluntarily or been resettled forcibly in various parts of the communist world; the largest such settlement was at Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia. The German occupation and the Civil War had left the countryside devastated, the economic infrastructure largely rubble, and the government broke. The most pressing need, then, was the material reconstruction of the country, which required continuation of the large-scale United States aid commitment. In the early days of the Cold War, the West gave priority to reinvigorating Greece because of its strategic location. In a bipolar world, Greece's international orientation was preordained.

As part of the European Recovery Program (commonly called the Marshall Plan), an American Mission of Aid to Greece (AMAG) was established to assist and oversee the nation's economic recovery. Millions of United States dollars poured into Greece. As part of the agreement between Greece and the United States, members of the AMAG were given wideranging supervisory powers that quickly led to the formation of parallel administrations—one Greek and one American. Greece had become, for all intents and purposes, a client to the United States.

Initially the bulk of foreign aid went into military expenditures; thus, while other parts of Europe were rebuilding their civilian industrial infrastructures, Greece was forging a military apparatus whose sole function was to contain communist expansion. With the cessation of the Civil War in 1949, the focus of aid spending shifted to civilian priorities. The national currency, the drachma (for the value of the drachma-see Glossary), required stabilization because bouts of hyperinflation during the war years had rendered it valueless. Faith had to be restored in the monetary system. Exports had to be revived. And, of course, the core of Greek agriculture and industry required rebuilding. Greece (especially Athens) came to resemble a giant work site with building construction everywhere; new roads were built and old ones refurbished; and hydroelectric stations were built to power new industry. In 1953 the drachma was devalued in order to make Greek products more competitive. Other measures were taken as well to attract foreign capital to Greece. These policies ushered in a new phase of growth in the early 1950s. However, massive dependence on foreign aid came at the price of foreign dependence in international relations.

Civilian Politics Resume

In February 1950, martial law was lifted in preparation for the first general election since 1946. The social upheavals of wartime enfranchised parts of society previously excluded from political participation; women, emancipated in some ways under the PEEA, were to receive the right to vote in 1951. In the elections of 1950, no fewer than forty-four parties, most of them centered on individual politicians rather than political principles, contested the 250 seats in parliament. Tsaldaris and the Populists won a plurality of only sixty-two, giving the balance of power to a group of center-right parties: the Liberals, led by Sophocles Venizelos, the son of the former prime minister, the National Progressive Center Union under General Plastiras, and the Georgios Papandreou Party. These three parties agreed to form a coalition government with Plastiras at the helm.

In the elections of 1951, called because no stable coalition emerged from the 1950 elections, two new organizations appeared. The royalist Greek Rally Party, under Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, commander of the national army when it defeated the DAG, included a broad spectrum of Greek society and was modeled on the French Rally Party of Charles de Gaulle. The popularity of Papagos, who had reinstated the autonomy of the Greek military during his tenure as its commander, enabled Greek Rally to eclipse the Populists by garnering 114 seats to the Populists' two. The United Democratic Party, a front for the banned KKE, won ten seats although many of its candidates were in prison. Based on their combined 131 seats, the Liberals and the Center Union formed another shaky centrist ruling coalition. At this point, Greece felt the sharp edge of dependency on the United States. Threatening to withdraw aid, the United States ambassador urged that the electoral system be changed from proportional to simple majority representation, a move that would favor Papagos's conservative Greek Rally Party. Politicians reluctantly made the change. The elections of 1952 gave Greek Rally 247 of 300 seats in parliament, beginning a decade of dominance by the right. This episode also set a pattern of political parties altering voting laws while in office to ensure future electoral success.

The Papagos administration took advantage of its parliamentary majority to unite conservatives and begin to improve Greece's economic situation. Devaluation of the drachma spurred exports and attracted additional capital from the West. Papagos also improved Greece's international security by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and by entering the Balkan Pact with Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1953. The latter agreement soon dissolved, however, when Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union improved. Stimulated by Greece's new status as a NATO ally of Turkey, Papagos began negotiations with Britain and Turkey over the status of Cyprus, a British crown colony and the home of the largest remaining Greek population in territory adjacent to Greece. When those talks failed in 1955 amid anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and political violence stirred by the Greek-Cypriot National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston—EOKA), relations between Greece and Turkey entered three decades of hostility.

The Rise of Karamanlis

Papagos died in office in 1955. During his tenure, an obscure politician, Konstantinos Karamanlis, had risen quickly in the Greek Rally Party. In the Papagos government of 1952– 55, Karamanlis was a very effective, although autocratic, minister of public works. When Papagos died, King Paul surprised observers by choosing Karamanlis to form a new government. The forty-eight-year-old Macedonian reorganized the Greek Rally Party as the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizopastiki Enosis—ERE) and proceeded to hold power until 1963.

During the Karamanlis years, the economy continued to grow by most statistical indicators, although it remained under state control and did not develop in new directions. Growth was especially fast in construction, shipping, and tourism. The state bureaucracy, the largest employer except for agriculture, became bloated, inefficient, and politically entrenched in this period. The service sector was the fastest growing element in the Greek economy. Overall, the standard of living of the majority of Greeks improved markedly in the 1950s in comparison with the sufferings of the previous years. Between 1951 and 1964, average per capita income quadrupled, and prices remained stable.

In the same period, Greeks flocked to cities in numbers unseen since 1900. Athens was the favorite destination of rural citizens seeking to improve their economic position. When the high expectations of Greece's shifting population were not realized, however, the postwar consensus that had supported the right began to crumble.

In foreign relations, the two dominant issues of the immediate postwar era, the Cold War and Cyprus, remained critical for Greece. Karamanlis was firmly convinced that Greece's fortunes lay with the West and that Greece must become "European." Karamanlis wanted to move closer to Europe than membership in NATO alone, so in 1962 he won associate status for Greece in the European Community (EC) with the promise of full membership in 1984. He also established close personal contacts in Washington, receiving an official visit from the United States president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 1959. No other United States president visited Greece until 1990.

The other overriding issue of the day was Cyprus. The postwar climate of British decolonization had led to expectations that Cyprus, whose population was 80 percent Greek, might become free to join with Greece. There were two obstacles: Cyprus's strategic importance to Britain and the Turkish population on the island. For Britain, Cyprus had a special role in protecting British oil supply lines from the Middle East. In 1954 Britain's foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, had stated simply that, because of that factor, Britain would never relinquish Cyprus. The sizeable Turkish population on the island meant that Turkey also had a stake in the future disposition of the island, if Britain were to agree to a change in its status.

In 1955 the EOKA campaign of violence and terrorism aimed at disrupting British rule and uniting Cypriot Greeks with Greece. After years of conflict and delicate negotiations, the interested parties finally reached a settlement in 1959. The island would be independent and ruled by a joint Greek and Turkish government formulated roughly according to the size of each population. The president would be Greek, the vice president Turkish. Greeks were awarded 70 percent of seats in parliament, with the Turkish minority holding veto power; 60 percent of the army was to be Greek. Britain retained one airfield and one army base, and Greece and Turkey were able to station military advisers on the island. The three nations jointly guaranteed the security of the island, and each had the right to intervene to defend it. The establishment of even temporary peace on Cyprus was a major accomplishment, but this solution was not popular in Greece.

Electoral Shifts to the Left, 1958-63

Karamanlis's role in compromise talks with Turkey began a process of weakening in the ERE's electoral support that continued into the early 1960s. At the same time, elder statesman Georgios Papandreou's coalition profited from public disaffection with Karamanlis to revive the center-left after decades of suppression.

The first sign of deterioration in the conservative party's position came in the 1958 parliamentary elections. The ERE lost seats as the United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera—EDA), ally of the outlawed communist party, gained the second-highest vote total. Seeking validation of his pro-Europe policies and the Cyprus treaty, Karamanlis asked for new elections in 1961. His ERE party recovered somewhat from the 1958 result by obtaining 51 percent of the vote and 176 seats in parliament. Former Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and his Center Union (Enosis Kentrou—EK), in association with some smaller centrist parties, finished second with 34 percent of the vote and won 100 seats. The EDA finished third with 15 percent and 24 seats.

The 1961 elections were marred by widespread allegations of tampering and corruption. Army and police units, alarmed by the high procommunist turnout in 1958, openly intimidated voters, especially in areas known for their left-wing sympathies. Although Karamanlis likely played no role in the voting irregularities, Papandreou found an issue to rally the people: he charged electoral fraud and demanded that the elections be declared void. When they were not, he committed himself to a "relentless struggle" to ensure free and fair elections in Greece.

Many people had grown weary of the stifling of the left, which had continued since the end of the war. Many leftists were still in prison, internal security forces continued to wield great influence, and advancement in the civil service and the military remained dependent on political affiliation. In short, people were tired of the suppression of personal freedoms. In the early 1960s, political violence increased, as exemplified by the 1963 assassination of EDA deputy Grigorios Lambrakis by thugs connected to the security forces (an event dramatized in Costa Gavras's film Z).

Karamanlis felt his support deteriorating both to the left and to the right. He clashed with King Paul and Queen Frederika on a number of issues, especially the relationship between the monarch and the military. Karamanlis also became convinced that the power of the military was inappropriate for a democratic state. Once more the constitutional question regarding the role of the monarchy was rising to the surface of Greek political life, and, as in the past, it inevitably involved the armed forces as well. Finally, in early 1963 Karamanlis yielded and tendered his resignation. Upon its acceptance, he went into self-imposed exile in Paris.

The Junta

A number of developments between 1963 and 1967 led to a successful military coup. Social conditions declined despite

economic growth. Crowding into cities gave rise to renewed demands for social welfare and better income distribution. The emigration that had commenced in the late 1950s continued into the 1960s (about 452,300 Greeks left between 1963 and 1967). And labor groups were much more militant than they had been at any other time in the postwar period.

Conditions for Overthrow

Another development centered on Cyprus. In 1963 the demand of Cyprus's president, Archbishop Makarios III, for a reduction in the powers of the Turkish minority caused fighting to break out on the island, and all-out war loomed when Turkey threatened an invasion to defend Cypriot Turks. Only the forceful intervention of the United States president, Lyndon B. Johnson, prevented an invasion in early 1964. The United Nations peacekeeping forces that entered Cyprus to prevent war at that point have remained on the island since that time. The Cyprus conflict convinced many in the military of the need to step up war readiness.

The third event was the succession of the inexperienced twenty-four-year-old Constantine II to the throne upon the death of his father Paul in March 1964. Just one month before, the Center Union had won a resounding victory, garnering 52.7 percent of the popular vote and a majority 173 seats in parliament to push the right out of power. Thus the military was deprived of both its royal patron and its connection with the majority party. In the eyes of the right, such changes meant that public order was deteriorating at the same time that war with Turkey seemed imminent.

Instability in the Papandreou Regime

Papandreou's Center Union government enacted a number of far-reaching social and political reforms. Prominent among them was the release of all political prisoners. To deal with the economic crises, Georgios Papandreou appointed his son Andreas, the former chairman of the Economics Department at the University of California at Berkeley, as minister of the economy. Many in the Center Union resented this move. Rising stars in the party such as Konstantinos Mitsotakis felt especially slighted by the appointment. The younger Papandreou, who held far more radical views than his father, soon became involved with a group of left-leaning military officers known as Aspida. The right viewed these developments suspiciously. Placard celebrating overthrow of national government by military junta, April 21, 1967 Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg



Cabals formed in the army as once again rightist military men assumed the role of "protectors" of the nation. To regain control of the armed forces, Georgios Papandreou forced the resignation of his minister of defense and sought the king's approval to name himself minister of defense. The constitutional question again came to the forefront when Constantine refused the request. In this case, the question was who controlled the military, the king or the prime minister, and the clash of personalities between the two men exacerbated the conflict.

Papandreou resigned in disgust in July 1965. In the succeeding months, a series of caretaker governments came and went, leaving the ship of state adrift. Constantine eventually called for elections in May 1967, and an overwhelming Center Union victory seemed certain. Fearing a purge of hard-line right wingers from the military, a group of junior officers put Operation Prometheus into action in April 1967, and the government of Greece fell into the hands of the junta of the colonels.

The Accession of the Colonels, 1967

The leaders of the self-styled "Glorious Revolution" were two colonels and a brigadier general, whose regime came to be known simply as "the junta," or "the colonels." Supporters of the coup were predominantly officers from lower-class backgrounds who had achieved status through career advancement in the armed forces. Fearful of losing their posts because of their involvement in right-wing conspiracies, they acted out of self-preservation, under the flimsy pretense of forestalling a communist takeover and defending Helleno-Christian civilization in general. The junta succeeded because of the political leadership vacuum at the time and because they were able to strike quickly and effectively. By seizing the main lines of communication, they presented an unsuspecting nation with a fait accompli.

Initially the colonels tried to rule through the king and the existing political system. But, gaining the cooperation of very few politicians, they soon began to arrest all those who showed signs of resisting the takeover, consolidating as much power as possible in their own hands. Andreas Papandreou, for example, was arrested for his connection to the Aspida group; he was released only under intense international pressure. As the methods of the colonels began to resemble those of the Metaxas dictatorship, Constantine organized a countercoup in December 1967, then fled into exile when his plan failed.

Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, one of three officers who led the coup, rose to the top of the regime and remained there until November 1973. The junta's aims and policies were a curious mixture of populist reforms and paternalistic authoritarianism backed by propaganda and terror. The overarching, proclaimed intent of the military government was to purge Greek society of the moral sickness that had developed since the war. Their more frivolous social policies included the banning of miniskirts and mandatory short hair for men. The regime lacked a base of popular support and remained in power through terror. A formidable secret police apparatus monitored society, using torture and committing other human rights violations that were widely reported by international organizations. In the first three years, the main targets of this policy were known supporters of the communists, but many centrist figures also were arrested.

The regime's brutality made it an international pariah. The only foreign dignitary of note to visit Greece during this period was the Greek-American United States vice president, Spiro Agnew. Greece withdrew from the EC in 1969 to avoid suspension of its association agreement. Nevertheless, Greece's NATO allies confined themselves to verbal condemnation because the regime fulfilled every geopolitical requirement, anchoring the alliance's defenses in the unstable eastern Mediterranean. The United States broke off full diplomatic relations only briefly after Constantine's exile; although military aid to Greece decreased between 1967 and 1973, in 1972 the United States negotiated permanent access to Greek port facilities for its Sixth Fleet.

The Junta Falls

Because the reign of terror was effective in Greece, resistance to the colonels formed mainly abroad. Prominent among the anti-junta groups was the Panhellenic Liberation Movement led by Andreas Papandreou. Such organizations kept international attention focused on the actions of the junta, but it was the regime's own ineptitude and lack of legitimacy that led eventually to its downfall.

The two immediate causes of the fall of the colonels were the Greek student movement and events in Cyprus. In the autumn of 1973, large-scale student demonstrations, motivated by repression at universities, deterioration of the economy, and a drastic increase in inflation, began open defiance of the junta's ban on public assemblies. When students occupied the National Polytechnic University of Athens and began clandestine radio broadcasts calling for the people of Athens to rise up against tyranny, the junta responded by calling in the army in November 1973. Tanks crushed the gathering brutally. The incident exposed the regime's lack of control over society and showed the public that resistance was not futile. The junta lurched even farther to the right when Dimitrios Ioannides, former head of the secret police, overthrew Papodopoulos and replaced him at the head of the government.

Believing that a major nationalist cause would rally the people behind him, in 1974 Ioannides induced a confrontation with Turkey over control of recently discovered oil deposits in the Aegean Sea. He also intensified his ongoing attempts to undermine Makarios by supporting Greek Cypriot terrorist activity. In July, when junta-inspired Cypriots engineered a coup against Makarios, Turkey immediately invaded Cyprus under its rights as a guarantor of the security of the republic established in 1960. Ioannides received little response when he called for full mobilization of the Greek military, which had already shown disaffection by scattered revolts. Thus the Cyprus crisis made clear that the regime's most fundamental base of support was crumbling. At this point, Greek military leaders and politicians collectively decided that only former Prime Minister Karamanlis possessed the ability and the level of popular support needed to dismantle the dictatorship and restore democracy to Greece. Four days after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Karamanlis arrived from Paris and took up the task.

Karamanlis and the Restoration of Democracy

Karamanlis faced the formidable task of clearing the wreckage left by the seven years of military rule. There were two major domestic missions: the restoration of a full range of political parties and reestablishing the military as a positive force. A new constitution and a legitimate referendum on the monarchy were the main legislative priorities, but the new role of the military remained more controversial in the 1970s.

The Electoral Triumph of the ND, 1974

Legalization of the KKE was a symbolic step toward finally ending the tensions that had simmered under the surface of Greek politics since the Metaxas regime. In an uncertain climate, Karamanlis scheduled elections for November. Karamanlis's newly formed party, New Democracy (Nea Demokratia— ND), swept into power with 54 percent of the vote and 219 seats in parliament. Surprisingly, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima—PASOK), which Andreas Papandreou founded on the basis of his anti-junta resistance group, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, received nearly 14 percent of the popular vote with a platform opposing Western alliances and the monarchy.

The Center Union, the only major precoup party to appear on the 1974 ballot, gained 21 percent of the vote—but it was soon to be a spent force. The United Left Party (Enomeni Aristera), a coalition of the pro-Moscow and anti-Moscow communist factions that had separated in 1968, received 9 percent of the votes. Now other political questions loomed; most important of these were the fate of the monarchy and the disposition of the junta and its followers.

Dealing with the Monarchy and the Military

Karamanlis staged yet another referendum on the monarchy (the sixth since 1920), in an effort to settle finally the rancorous debate that had poisoned Greek politics throughout the twentieth century. In December 1974, a majority of 70 percent of Greek voters opted to abolish the monarchy. Not coincidentally, this margin was nearly identical to the figure attained in the only other legitimate vote on the monarchy, that of 1924, which had established the interwar republic.

Punishing the junta and reforming the military and the civil service were more delicate operations. Karamanlis wanted to avoid a repetition of the military retributions of the 1920s and to preserve relations between the civilian government and the military. Accordingly, the three top leaders of the junta received death sentences that were later commuted, as did Ioannides. However, none of the more than 100 civilian ministers who had served the junta was convicted of a criminal offense. Many people serving in the military and the police were tried and convicted, and universities were purged of junta sympathizers.

The Constitution of 1975

In 1975 a new constitution was promulgated to establish Greece as a republic with a political structure modelled on that of France (see The Branches of Government, ch. 4). The constitution invested great power in the president, who is obligated to choose as prime minister the leader of the party gaining the most seats in parliamentary elections. Until the constitution was amended in 1986, the president could veto legislation, dissolve parliament, and call for a direct vote of no confidence in parliament (see The Presidency, ch. 4). The sharp escalation of executive authority was controversial, but Karamanlis declared strong presidential powers necessary to deal with extraordinary episodes of Greece's political conflict. The five-year administration of Konstantinos Tsatsos, the first president under the new constitution, passed without his using the considerable powers that had been given to his office.

Cyprus and Relations with the United States

Cyprus continued to dominate Greek foreign policy in the mid-1970s. From the Greek standpoint, the unresolved status of the island was chiefly the doing of the United States, and a substantial anti-Western backlash colored Greek foreign policy during that period.

Since the invasion of 1974, Turkish troops have remained on the island. Although a cease-fire was negotiated in Geneva in August, talks broke off almost immediately, and the Turkish army began to expand its zone of occupation to a line that included 37 percent of Cypriot territory. Karamanlis, however, was intent on avoiding armed conflict, for which Greece was unprepared, and talks resumed shortly thereafter. In 1975 a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared in the northern part of the island, and negotiations continued intermittently for another two years. A 1977 agreement divided the island provisionally, but no lasting, workable solution was achieved. In 1994 the fate of Cyprus remained a pressing issue that continued to impair relations between Greece and Turkey (see Assessing the Turkish Threat, ch. 5).

The Greek public reacted to the Turkish presence on Cyprus with resentment toward NATO and the United States. In the view of many Greeks, the benefits of membership in a West European security organization were meaningless if the alliance could not stop a NATO ally from invading a country such as Cyprus. In protest Karamanlis withdrew Greece from military structures of NATO, a status that remained until 1980. Greece held the United States and its foreign policy establishment particularly responsible for the Cyprus invasions because of its failure to prevent Turkish action or to compel Turkey's withdrawal after the fact. In 1975 the United States Central Intelligence Agency was still widely held responsible for aiding the junta's accession and supporting its regime. This hostility was partly a backlash against the dependent relationship of postwar Greece to the United States, partly the result of resentment for United States support of the junta.

In blaming the United States for events in Cyprus, Greeks also overestimated the United States' leverage over Turkey. Tension increased in 1976 when the United States, having repealed partially its arms embargo, exchanged US\$1 billion in military equipment for military installations in Turkey. Greek protests resulted in a similar agreement with Greece, worth US\$700 million, and the establishment of a seven-to-ten ratio that became the standard formula for United States aid apportionment between the two countries.

In the late 1970s, two new issues exacerbated animosities between Greece and Turkey. The first involved the control of the northern Aegean. Each side claimed (and still claims) large areas of the region on the basis of offshore territorial rights. Because the boundaries between mainland Turkey and the Greek islands in the Aegean are so close, the six-mile offshore limits often overlap (see fig. 2). Control of the continental shelf became much more critical with the discovery of oil in the region. On three occasions since the late 1970s, Greece and Turkey have nearly gone on to war over this issue. Other sources of irritation were the question of air control over the Aegean, Greece's attempts to extend its six-mile limit to the twelve-mile limit used elsewhere, and the two countries' treatment of their respective Greek and Turkish minorities. The end of the Cold War greatly diminished the incentive for cooperation against communist neighbors, emboldening both countries to take more independent stands over regional issues.

Domestic and Electoral Politics, 1975-77

The period of domination by the ND included concerted attempts at national reconciliation. Economically, Karamanlis pushed for closer integration with Europe, a policy rewarded in 1981 with full membership in the EC. The ND government practiced statist capitalism, meaning that the state had an intrusive and direct role in determining economic policy at the same time that it tried to foster a free-market system. The primacy of the state in economic affairs was evident in all areas, from prices and wages to labor law. In postjunta Greece, the debate has centered on the degree, rather than the existence, of government intervention in the economy.

Karamanlis called an election in 1977, a year earlier than required by the constitution. A particular goal of this strategy was to obtain validation of his government's foreign policy initiatives. The major surprise of the 1977 election results was the rise of Andreas Papandreou and PASOK. ND's share of the vote fell to 42 percent (172 seats) while PASOK's share rose to 25 percent (93 seats). The Center Union dropped into a distant third place (12 percent and 15 seats), barely ahead of the KKE (10 percent, 11 seats). PASOK's success came largely at the expense of the declining Center Union, which split into factions shortly thereafter. ND's losses had multiple causes. Some ND supporters moved to a new far-right party, and the political equilibrium that Karamanlis had achieved since 1974 removed some of the urgency with which Greeks had supported him in the previous election. ND lacked a clear ideology; instead, the charisma of its leader was its chief rallying point.

At the same time, PASOK's message had increasing resonance with the people. In his rhetoric, Papandreou crafted a

skillful mix of nationalism ("Greece for the Greeks") and socialism ("PASOK in government, the people in power"). PASOK promised a "third road" to socialism and a middle way in foreign policy, restoring national pride by breaking the bonds of foreign dependency and reorienting Greece with the nonaligned countries. PASOK's structure also gave it a base of grass-roots support that other parties lacked. Besides its strong central committee, PASOK had local party offices and cadres in towns and villages across Greece. This system proved very effective in organizing support and validating the claim that the party was not based, like the others, on networks of patronage. And, perhaps most importantly, PASOK's slogan of "change" struck a cord with the Greek people's search for a new way forward after forty years of conservative rule.

The Rise and Fall of Papandreou and PASOK

By the elections of 1981, electoral momentum had shifted away from an uninspired ND to the promise of change offered by a newly moderate PASOK. For the next eight years, Papandreou applied his program to society and the economy, with mixed results.

In 1980 Karamanlis elevated himself to the presidency, leaving the lackluster Georgios Rallis as the incumbent prime minister in the next year's elections. In the elections of October 1981, PASOK and Papandreou swept into power with 48 percent of the popular vote and 172 seats in parliament. The ND, which could not match Papandreou's charisma or the novelty of PASOK's program, finished a distant second with 36 percent of the vote and 115 seats, and the KKE came in third with 11 percent and thirteen seats.

Between the 1977 and 1981 elections, PASOK and its leader had continued the move away from an initial image as a Marxism-based, class-oriented party, in order to reassure centrist voters. The "privileged" class against which Papandreou ran in 1981 had shrunk considerably to a small number of Greece's wealthiest citizens. The societal results of the "change" were left deliberately vague. The election result meant that, for the first time in Greek history, an explicitly left-wing party held the reigns of government. The transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy was finally complete (see The Return of the Left, ch. 4).

The PASOK Domestic Program

As it exercised power for the next eight years, PASOK did oversee considerable change in some areas. The new government brought in a sweeping domestic reform program under Papandreou's "Contract with the People". Many initial reforms were long-overdue and cost little. New laws legalized civil marriage, abolished (in theory) the dowry system, eased the process for obtaining a divorce, and decriminalized adultery. Other laws enhanced the legal status of women (see The Role of Women, ch. 2). The university system was overhauled, giving more power to staff and students (see Education, ch. 2). A comprehensive national health service was introduced, for the first time making modern medical procedures available in rural areas (see Health Care, ch. 2).

Some of PASOK's reforms met considerably less success, especially in government and economic reform. The pervasive blanket of smog over Athens, instead of being banished as promised, became thicker in the early 1980s (see Pollution Problems, ch. 2). An attempt to decentralize local government foundered because local administrative bodies had no financial base (see Local Government, ch. 4). And, after PASOK reforms initially gave trade unions greater freedom of action and improved labor relations, circumstances soon caused Papandreou's labor policy to reaffirm state control over labor-union activity. The selective socialization of key means of production, which was to emphasize worker participation and improve productivity, led instead to increased state patronage for inept companies and continued state control of unions (see The Structure of Employment, ch. 3).

Papandreou also attempted to further the national reconciliation by officially recognizing the role of the resistance during World War II, by granting rights of residence in Greece to those who had fled to communist countries after the Civil War, and by ending all public ceremonies that celebrated the victories of the National Army over the DAG. Only Greek refugees were allowed to return, however, excluding a large number of Macedonian Slav members of the DAG.

The greatest challenge to PASOK in the 1980s was managing the economy. The main problem was paying for social programs in the PASOK platform while keeping Greece militarily strong. In keeping with his campaign promise, Papandreou initially raised middle and low incomes, instituted price controls, and introduced tax incentives on investments, giving the state an even larger role than it had had under the ND regime. But by 1985, the annual inflation rate had risen to 25 percent, which led to devaluation of the drachma in what was presented as an austerity plan. The budget deficit still grew, eventually reaching 10 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). The public debt that spiralled out of control in the late 1980s continues to be a serious deterrent to economic growth in Greece in the 1990s (see The Public Sector and Taxation, ch. 3).

PASOK Foreign Policy

In foreign policy, PASOK proved far more moderate in power than it had been as an opposition party. Although Papandreou's strident anti-American rhetoric caused friction with the administration of United States president Ronald W. Reagan, PASOK was willing to compromise on specific issues such as continuation of United States bases in Greece, after vigorous negotiations. Despite his theoretical nonalignment and conciliation of bêtes noires of the West such as Muammar al Qadhafi of Libya, Saddam Husayn of Iraq, and Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Papandreou balanced Greece's international position by keeping Greece in NATO and the EC.

In its policy toward Turkey, the PASOK government stood firm. In 1982 Papandreou became the first Greek prime minister to visit Cyprus, signaling strong support for the Greek population of the divided island. In 1984 he mobilized the Greek military for war when Turkish batteries opened fire on a Greek destroyer. And in 1987, he once again brought Greece to the brink of war when Turkey threatened to send an oil exploration vessel into Greek territorial waters. In 1988 a thaw resulted from a meeting between Papandreou and Turkey's President Turgut Özal in Davos, Switzerland, where new avenues of bilateral communication and consultation were arranged. Soon thereafter, however, the "spirit of Davos" was strained again by disputes over the treatment of minorities, air space, and access to Aegean oil.

Scandal and Decline

Papandreou's fortunes began to turn during the summer of 1988. In August he underwent major heart surgery, but he refused to yield the reins of power. The opposition mocked his technique as "government by fax." A further complication was the announcement that Papandreou intended to divorce his American wife of thirty-seven years—herself a very popular figure in Greece—in order to marry a thirty-four-year-old airline stewardess who had gained influence in Papandreou's entourage. The family rift caused by this announcement damaged the cohesion within PASOK because Papandreou's sons occupied key positions in the party.

But it was a financial scandal that rocked the political world of Greece most violently. In November 1988, a shortfall of US\$132 million was discovered in the Bank of Crete some months after bank chairman Georgios Koskotas, a Greek-American millionaire entrepreneur under investigation for largescale financial crime, had fled the country (see PASOK's Second Term, 1985–89, ch. 4). In the months that followed, alleged connections between Koskotas and the PASOK government, and even with Papandreou himself, brought the resignations of several ministers and demands for a vote of no confidence in the government. Papandreou, whose second four-year term was to expire within months, held onto power.

Electoral Stalemate

As he awaited PASOK's inevitable losses in the elections of June 1989, Papandreou adjusted the electoral system to make it more proportional and hinder formation of a majority by a rival party. The strategy succeeded in part. Under the leadership of Papandreou's old rival Konstantinos Mitsotakis, ND won 44 percent of the vote, but it fell six seats short of a majority. A short-lived conservative-communist coalition government was formed. In a matter of months, a second election also failed to produce a clear victor that could form an effective government. Finally, in April 1990, ND won a narrow majority of seats and formed the government. Papandreou and the socialists were finally out of power after almost ten years.

In the 1990s, the critical challenges that Greece faces all have deep roots in its history. The end of the Cold War again raises the question of Greece's rightful position in global geopolitics—a question that has been answered in quite different ways as time has passed. As European integration continues apace, rumblings are heard from the richer, northern European nations about the economic burden placed on them by confederation with the poorer members to the south, especially Greece (see International Economic Policy in the 1990s, ch. 3). Closer integration in the European Union (as the European Community was renamed in December 1993) also stimulates new contemplation from within of Greece's differences and commonalities with Western Europe, the civilizations of which were enormously enriched by contact with Greek culture in the past. Through most of the modern era, however, the nations of the West (including the United States) have been protectors, invaders, or persistent sources of interference in the internal affairs of Greece, a nation lusting for past glory and independence but unable to recapture them. At the end of a uniquely chaotic century, Greeks sought the internal stability that would allow them again to offer the world the best of their culture.

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A number of good introductory publications are available in English. Richard Clogg's A Concise History of Greece serves as the best starting point. Clogg's earlier A Short History of Modern Greece is a valuable companion volume. C.M. Woodhouse's Modern Greece: A Short History and Campbell and Sherrard's Modern Greece are dated but still useful. A Profile of Modern Greece in Search of Identity by Kourvetaris and Dobratz provides a more holistic but flawed picture of the development of Greece in the modern era, and the misnamed collection of essays Background to Contemporary Greece, edited by Marion Sarafis and Martin Eve, contains a few very insightful articles. The essays collected by scholar Robert Browning in The Greeks: Classical, Byzantine, and Modern provide a solid introduction to the history of Greece from the first millennium B.C. Barbara Jelavich's two-volume History of the Balkans places Greece in the historical context of its region. The history and anthropology sections of the forthcoming bibliographical guide on modern Greece, to be published by the Modern Greek Studies Association, will prove invaluable for further investigation of Greek history. Finally, that association's Journal of Modern Greek Studies remains the flagship journal in the field, and it should be consulted for the latest developments in the study of modern Greece. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment



Griffon statue that guarded the temple of Apollo at Delphi

GREEK SOCIETY HAS DEVELOPED over a period of nearly 3,000 years, with only few interruptions, in a physical and geographical environment that contributed unique qualities and facilitated widespread dissemination of the elements of its civilization. Despite centuries of occupation by Roman and Otto-Greeks maintained man empires, the an unusually homogeneous ethnicity that today includes only very small minorities. Greece's ethnicity is reflected in the 97 percent of Greeks professing membership in the nation's established church, the Orthodox Church of Greece.

The homogeneity of Greek social traditions, which combine to represent the sense of "Greekness" that unites the nation, has overcome regional diversity. Historically, populations have been divided by mountains and the sea, as well as class differences. Until the second half of the twentieth century, the majority of Greeks tilled the land and led a quite separate existence from the urban elite.

For all of Greek society, the fundamental social unit is the nuclear family, membership in which is the most important element in individual identity. Although urbanization and Westernization have modified that institution in recent decades, ties of kinship, patronage, and ritual kinship still cut across classes and unite rural and urban Greeks. Urbanization and Westernization have also changed the traditional role of women, expanding their range of acceptable activities to include most of the areas formerly reserved for men. Social changes already underway were ratified as law after the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima-PASOK) came to power in 1981 with a platform of modernizing and secularizing social relationships. Although the program met substantial resistance from the church and elements of secular society, the changes and compromises that emerged have speeded the transformation of traditional society.

Since World War II, the Greek population has urbanized to a dramatic extent, predominantly in Athens and Thessaloniki, and social services have kept pace unevenly with that movement. Health services and social welfare programs are state run, but insurance and delivery are fragmented among several agencies and organizations. Education is very highly respected in Greek society, and its broad availability has steadily increased the middle class since the 1800s. The state monopoly over education at the university level has encouraged students to complete their educations outside Greece, however, because the number of university places has not kept pace with population growth. The curricula of primary and secondary schools have been modernized from the centuries-old forms of classical education only in recent decades.

Greece's physical environment, dominated by its mountains and the sea, has set the conditions under which society and the economy developed. Topographic and climatic regions vary from mountainous, isolated Epirus in the northwest to the sunny, windswept Cyclades Islands in the southern Aegean Sea. The sprawling metropolis of Greater Athens, containing over one-third of Greece's population, lies on a coastal plain at the southeastern tip of the Greek mainland. Rapid postwar industrialization and inadequate planning have created crisis conditions in air and water quality and land usage, most notably in the large metropolitan areas. Effective management of environmental problems has proved difficult, however, for both government and nongovernment agencies.

Physical Environment

The territory occupied by the Greek nation comprises the southern tip of the mountainous Balkan Peninsula and an intricate complex of smaller peninsulas and islands that define the northeast corner of the Mediterranean Sea. Because of this combination of physical features, the topography of Greece is extremely complex and varied. Including all its offshore territory, Greece occupies 131,957 square kilometers. It is bounded on the north by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM—the name internationally approved in 1993 for that entity after its 1991 declaration of independence) and Bulgaria; on the northwest by Albania; on the east by Turkey and the Aegean Sea; and on the south and west by the Sea of Crete, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Ionian Sea (see fig. 2).

Geographical Regions

The sea is the most consistent influence on the physical environment of Greece. The elaborately irregular Greek coastline, one of the longest in the world, includes about 15,000 kilometers of shore. No point on the mainland is farther than 100 kilometers from the water, and Greece includes more than 2,000 islands—of which about 170 are inhabited. Crete (Kriti), the largest of the islands, is the southernmost point of the nation with a significant population.

The second major physical feature, mountains, cover more than three-quarters of Greece's surface area. Although their general pattern is from northeast to southwest, the mountains and the basins between them form irregular barriers to movement across the peninsula. In Greece's early history, the isolating effect of the mountains encouraged populations to develop lasting traditions of independence because of their lack of communication with the outside world.

Beginning in ancient times, the sea endowed Greece with a seafaring tradition; the best-known work of classical Greek literature, Homer's Odyssey, describes a long and dangerous voyage assumedly made across the eastern Mediterranean from Asia Minor. Sea travel has promoted contact among populations in Greece and with other peoples, but its exposed peninsula has also made Greece vulnerable to attack from the sea.

Drainage patterns in Greece are affected by the large percentage of land surface covered by rock, by the steepness of the young mountains in the north, which form gorges with narrow, twisting, and fast-moving rivers, and by the deep indentations of the coastline, which shorten the course of rivers across the land mass. The short Greek rivers have irregular seasonal levels that make them unreliable for navigation and irrigation. The three major rivers of Greece—the Vardar (called the Axios by Greeks), the Struma (called the Strimon by Greeks), and the Nestos (called the Mesta by Bulgarians)—primarily drain other countries to the north and northwest.

The topography of both the mainland and most of the Greek islands is dominated by mountains; Greece has more than twenty peaks higher than 2,000 meters. The most important mountain range is the Pindus (Pindos), which extends from north to south in the center of the peninsula at an average elevation of about 2,650 meters (see fig. 7). The highest mountain in the range is Mt. Olympus (Olimbos), legendary home of the gods, which is 2,917 meters high. A southern extension of the Dinaric Alps of the former Yugoslavia and Albania, the Pindus Range consists of several rugged, parallel ridges, the longest of which extends from the Albanian border in the north to the Gulf of Corinth in the south. Geologically, the range extends across the Gulf of Corinth into the Peloponnesian Peninsula and southeastward to form the islands of the

southern Aegean Sea. The northern part of the range offers magnificent scenery of jagged peaks and picturesque gorges. The continuous settling and shifting of this comparatively young mountain range makes the entire region, from Epirus on the Albanian border south to Crete, prone to earthquakes. The Pindus is sparsely populated and generally not cultivated, but upland pasturing of sheep and goats is common.

Traditionally, Greece is divided into nine geographic regions that are differentiated by topography and regional tradition but not by political administration. The six mainland regions are Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus to the north, and Thessaly, Central Greece, and the Peloponnesus farther south. The three island regions are the Ionian Islands off the west coast, the Aegean Islands in the Aegean Sea between the Greek mainland and Turkey, and the island of Crete, which is considered a separate region.

Thrace

Greek Thrace (Thraki) is often distinguished as Western Thrace to differentiate the Greek portion of the large ancient region that is now divided among Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The area of Greek Thrace is 8,578 square kilometers. The eastern border with Turkey is formed by the Maritsa River (called the Evros by Greeks and the Meric by Turks), which flows southward into the Aegean Sea after flowing eastward across southern Bulgaria. The Nestos River flows from southern Bulgaria to define the regional border between Thrace and Macedonia to the west. No major rivers flow through Thrace.

Most of northern Thrace is dominated by the southern tier of the Rhodopes (Rodopi) Mountains, most of which lie in Bulgaria. The Thracian Plain runs along the shore of the Aegean Sea and along the Maritsa Valley to the east. This alluvial plain is cut into three parts by plateaus extending southward from the Rhodopes to the Aegean Sea. The three plains are the most agriculturally significant area of Thrace, and the region's three provinces are defined by their location.

The plain in Evros, the easternmost province, is a traditionally productive agricultural area, enriched by the fertile soil of the Maritsa Valley and by abundant water from the Maritsa and its tributaries. The plains in the other two Thracian provinces, Rodopi and Xanthi, also feature rich soil that is especially favorable for tobacco cultivation.




Figure 7. Topography and Drainage

Unlike Greece's other maritime regions, most of Thrace's coastline is smooth, broken only at the mouth of Lake Vistonis, which is actually a bay of the Aegean Sea located on the boundary of the provinces of Rodopi and Xanthi. The lake is the spawning area for commercially important fish species. The mountainous and sparsely populated island of Samothrace, about sixty kilometers offshore in the Aegean Sea, is administered as part of the province of Evros. The statue that became known as the Winged Victory of Samothrace, now a treasure of the Louvre Museum in Paris, was discovered on the island.

Thrace was the only region of Greece in which Muslims were allowed to remain according to the population exchanges prescribed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Today the Muslim population is concentrated in the provinces of Rodopi and Xanthi. Most of the region's residents are ethnically Greek, however, and many descend from Greek refugees who returned from Turkey in the Greek expatriation phase of the Lausanne agreement (see The Interwar Struggles, 1922–36, ch. 1).

Macedonia

Immediately to the west of Thrace, Macedonia (Makedonia) is the largest region of Greece, including thirteen provinces and the Monastic Republic of Mt. Athos, an autonomous area. Like Thrace, Macedonia is the Greek portion of a geographically larger area that now is politically divided among three countries. Besides the Greek region, the term Macedonia has included southwestern Bulgaria and FYROM, which until 1991 was the southeasternmost constituent part of Yugoslavia. Greek Macedonia extends westward from the Nestos River to the Albanian border. The southern border is the Aegean coastline, and the northern border is determined by the mountain ranges that extend from Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia. The most notable topographic feature is the Khalkidiki Peninsula, which extends three fingers of land southeastward into the Aegean Sea. Mt. Athos rises over 2,000 meters from the eastern peninsula and has provided seclusion for a legendary monastic community for more than a millennium.

The terrain of Macedonia is primarily rugged mountains interspersed with fertile river valleys and an extensive coastal plain defined by the Vardar River, which empties into the Aegean Sea after flowing southward from FYROM. The valleys of the Vardar and the Struma rivers, and the Plain of Drama in the far east, are Macedonia's agricultural centers. Greece's second-largest city and second-largest port, Thessaloniki (Salonika), is located between the Khalkidiki Peninsula and the mouth of the Vardar. West of Thessaloniki is a plain drained by the Vardar and Aliakmon rivers; the latter arises in the Pindus Mountains near the Albanian border and meanders eastward to form a swampy delta shared with the mouth of the Vardar just to the east. The delta then empties into the Gulf of Thermaikos, the northwesternmost extension of the Aegean Sea. The largest Macedonian island is Thasos, northeast of the Khalkidiki Peninsula.

Thessaloniki is located on the natural harbor of the Gulf of Thermaikos. The harbor ranks Thessaloniki second in importance as a Greek port, after the Piraeus complex south of Athens. In the postwar industrialization process, Thessaloniki's harbor came to serve new manufacturing complexes in the interior, and the city regained the commercial importance it had during the Middle Ages. Beginning in the 1950s, the city was redesigned and modernized. The Salonika Trade Fair is an important commercial event in the eastern Mediterranean.

The city was founded in 315 B.C.; its Christian community was the recipient of the epistles of Saint Paul to the Thessalonians that form two books of the New Testament of the Bible. Because it contains numerous sites of Hellenistic and Byzantine church buildings, Thessaloniki has become a center for the study of ancient architecture. The city belonged to the Byzantine Empire in two different periods, between which it was sacked and occupied by several tribes and kingdoms. The Ottoman Turks took Thessaloniki from Venice in 1430. In the late 1400s, the city was an important refuge for Jews driven from Spain, and it remained the center of Greece's Jewish population until the Nazi occupation virtually extinguished it. In modern times, Thessaloniki was the initial headquarters of the Young Turk movement in 1908, before becoming part of the Greek kingdom in 1913. It was a World War I base of Allied operations against Turkey as well as the capital of the breakaway pro-Allied government of Eleutherios Venizelos (see World War I and the National Schism, ch. 1).

The island of Thasos has rich mineral deposits that supported a prosperous community. The island changed hands frequently in the first millennium B.C. Its minerals long ago exhausted, Thasos became a tourist resort in the 1970s. Off-